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The drones are coming.1 But not just to your neighborhood skies – to the 
world’s oceans.  From recreational robots designed to autonomously follow 
divers and record video of them to low-cost, remotely operated submersibles 
that put ocean exploration in the hands of the general public to sophisticated 
military submersibles able to autonomously gather intelligence throughout the 
oceans, the underwater drone market is exploding.  But unlike on land, this 
explosion has not been accompanied by similar discussion of privacy concerns.  
Instead, the ocean’s rapid shift away from an inaccessible operational sanctu-
ary is one that is happening largely silently.  And it is one that is happening in 
an economically critical environment with far fewer legal protections in place 
than on land.  This Article examines this monumental shift, exploring for the 
first time privacy and trade secret protections from underwater surveillance.  I 
argue that privacy protections are already unconstitutionally eroded underwa-
ter and must be strengthened in the face of widespread drone use. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The ocean’s mysteries will not remain hidden from rapidly developing 
technology . . . .” – Mary Ann Becker2 
 
In 1948, oceanographer F.P. Shepard famously stated that we knew more 
“about the surface of the moon than about the vast areas that lie beneath three-
fourths of the surface of our own planet.”3  Seventy years later, this statement 
remains largely true.4  Historically, spatial and technological constraints have 
limited underwater exploration to highly funded commercial and military ven-
tures.5  But today these barriers to entry are changing.  As drone technologies 
become cheaper and more powerful, underwater exploration is blossoming in 
 
 1. Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth Amendment Stop 
Their Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279 (2013); Megan Garber, The 
Drones Are Coming: The FAA Just Issued the First Permit for Commercial UAV Op-
eration, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ar-
chive/2014/06/the-faa-just-approved/372508/; Jonathan Hunter, The Drones Are Com-
ing, HILL (Sept. 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-secu-
rity/297879-the-drones-are-coming. 
 2. Mary Ann Becker, Comment, Regulating the Business of Culture: The 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act – Can Preservationists, Salvors, and Divers Sail in Calmer 
Waters?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 603 (2001). 
 3. F.P. SHEPARD, SUBMARINE GEOLOGY (1948). 
 4. Hilary Brueck, Humans Are About to Touch the Deepest Corners of the Ocean 
for the First Time – An Endeavor as Dangerous as Landing on the Moon, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/submarine-to-visit-deepest-parts-of-
the-ocean-in-five-deeps-expedition-2018-10. 
 5. Laurence Reza Wrathall, Comment, The Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastruc-
ture to Underwater Attack: Legal Shortcomings and the Way Forward, 12 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L. J. 223, 236–37 (2010). 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/6
2019] SECRETS OF THE DEEP 49 
what some have called the “inner space race.”6  The advent of widely available 
underwater vehicles has not only expanded the commercial possibilities but for 
the first time put remotely operated submersibles in the hands of the general 
public.7  Recreational drones carry high-resolution cameras and allow explo-
ration of underwater shipwrecks and other features previously accessible only 
to highly technical dive teams or commercial submersibles.8  As the founders 
of OpenROV, one of the first companies to manufacture these drones, put it, 
their goal is to create “a lot more eyes in the ocean.”9 
The magnitude of this shift should not be downplayed.  Historically, un-
derwater areas have been defined by the very absence of human eyes.10  Vast 
spaces coupled with logistical difficulties have established the ocean as an “op-
erational sanctuary” where even the most unsophisticated vessels and operators 
are unlikely to be detected.11  Marine operations have long taken advantage of 
this fact, relying on their environment to ensure the secrecy of commercially 
and militarily critical equipment.12  Underwater drone use is changing this sta-
tus quo, and that fact’s importance has been recognized by both military13 and 
commercial14 interests.  The global oceans are a crucial part of the global econ-
omy, through commercial fishing, underwater mining, shipping, oil and gas 
extraction, and a host of other uses.15  As the number of eyes in the ocean 
increases, new legal questions also arise about where and how these eyes can 
be used and whether they will interfere with the existing uses that have relied 
on secrecy for so long. 
These questions have gone essentially unexplored in relation to underwa-
ter drones, but this is not the case with aerial drones.  Aerial drones have seen 
an even more dramatic explosion in availability and use, prompting considera-
ble discussion among scholars and policymakers on what privacy limits exist 
to prevent aerial drone surveillance.16  Aerial drones, like underwater drones, 
 
 6. Robert L. Wernli, AUV Commercialization – Who’s Leading the Pack?, in 
OCEANS 2000 MTS/IEEE: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 391, 394 (2000). 
 7. John Markoff, A Drone Start-Up Explores Underwater, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/technology/a-drone-start-up-explores-un-
derwater.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Wrathall, supra note 5, at 234. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id.at 234–35.  For example, telecommunications infrastructure is placed in 
this environment.  Id. 
 13. See Andrew H. Henderson, Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicles, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2006). 
 14. Wrathall, supra note 5, at 237–39. 
 15. OVE HOEGH-GULDBERG ET AL., WWF, REVIVING THE OCEAN ECONOMY: THE 
CASE FOR ACTION – 2015 at 7, 23 (2015), http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publica-
tions/790/files/original/Reviving_Ocean_Economy_REPORT_low_res.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 29, 32 (2011); GREGORY MCNEAL, DRONES AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
3
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are able to access areas that were previously inaccessible – the low airspace 
above people’s homes, for instance.  This novel access has prompted extensive 
debate about the limits of private property and privacy interests in these previ-
ously inaccessible areas.17  
Underwater drones prompt the same questions, though if aerial drones are 
notable for the sheer volume of privacy discussions they have spurred, under-
water drones are notable for the opposite.  The question of privacy rights at sea 
has received essentially no attention in the academic literature.  Just as the clear 
limits of ownership above a person’s property had no reason to be fully con-
sidered prior to the advent of aerial drones, so too has there been no reason to 
consider the extent of privacy and personal property underwater.  As such, the 
legal regime of underwater privacy is a sketchy outline at best. 
Intuitively, privacy in the oceans may seem a relatively esoteric question: 
unlike aerial drones where the potential privacy infringements are obvious and 
widespread,18 the underwater implications are less clear.  People do not have 
homes and correspondingly sacrosanct privacy rights underwater.  However, 
the commercial, military, and recreational uses of the ocean represent a sub-
stantial and strategically crucial portion of our national economy.19  From 
deep-sea drilling to aquaculture to undersea pipelines, a significant amount of 
commercial, recreational, and military activity happens underwater.20  These 
activities have taken place out of sight of the public until now, with operators 
relying on secrecy both to disguise important commercial processes as well as 
hide in many cases flagrant law-breaking.21  The potential for their surveillance 
raises serious concerns for many entities, and drone use has the capacity to 
completely change methods of operation in the underwater environment. 
In just one example of how drones are changing marine operations, drones 
are increasingly being used to claim possession over sunken ships under the 
maritime law of finds and salvage.  Historically, divers were often placed in 
extreme peril to find and claim sunken ships once treasure hunters had located 
them.22  Today, drones have replaced divers both in searching for historical 
vessels as well as in legally claiming these vessels for salvors under maritime 
law.23  Courts have found that “seeing” a shipwreck on a drone’s video feed is 
 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATURES 2–4 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/07/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 16, at 32; MCNEAL, supra note 16, at 2–4. 
 18. MCNEAL, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 19. See, e.g., Wrathall, supra note 5, at 225–30 (discussing critical infrastructure 
in the ocean). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/world/the-outlaw-ocean.html. 
 22. See Drew F.T. Horrell, Note, Telepossession Is Nine-Tenths of the Law: The 
Emerging Industry of Deep Ocean Discovery, 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 309, 312–13 
(1991). 
 23. Id. at 310–13, 321–22. 
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sufficient to establish a right to a ship,24 creating an easy avenue for treasure 
hunters to make salvage claims.  Courts have long upheld salvage claims based 
on Remotely Operated Vehicle (“ROV”) observation: in 1989, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia famously found that telepresence es-
tablished the right to the deep (and abundant gold-filled) shipwreck of the S.S. 
Central America.25  This decision made telepresence capabilities an important 
part of salvage and had huge economic impacts on the marine salvage industry.  
In 1989, for example, the U.S. government “found” a shipwreck using a ROV 
and subsequently sold the salvage rights it had acquired to private investors to 
carry out salvage.26  At the time this was revolutionary, but today the wide-
spread availability of underwater drones makes buying and selling of under-
water rights possible on a far grander scale.  Treasure hunters in particular are 
afraid of competition for claims, as drones expand the possibilities for salvage 
claims to members of the public who were previously financially or logistically 
foreclosed from engaging in treasure-hunting activities.27  Furthermore, this 
expansion also raises significant privacy and commercial confidentiality con-
cerns.  Traditionally, treasure hunting was a highly guarded, secret enterprise.28  
Public surveillance of the shipwrecks, their contents, and the retrieval methods 
has led to extremely heated disputes, and increasing surveillance by drones is 
likely to do the same.29 
As underwater drones are becoming widely availability, questions about 
how underwater interests may be protected from outside surveillance are timely 
and novel.  This Article addresses these issues, drawing on analogues from 
privacy discussions about aerial drones to understand what protections, if any, 
there may be from surveillance by drones operating underwater.  In Part I, I 
give background information on the types and capabilities of drones currently 
operating in the marine environment.  I also lay out the characteristics of exist-
ing maritime entities operating at sea and examine how they may be susceptible 
to drone surveillance.  In Part II, I ask what personal privacy and commercial 
confidentiality rights these entities may have under existing U.S. law, address-
ing both public and private regimes.  Part III looks at these rights in interna-
tional waters under the the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
 24. Id. at 338. 
 25. Id. at 338–342. 
 26. Id. at 355 n.200. 
 27. See Jeff Hecht, Military Robot Subs Seek Out Sunken Treasure, NEWSCIENTIST 
(May 27, 2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13990-military-robot-subs-
seek-out-sunken-treasure/ (discussing cheaper underwater autonomous vehicles and 
their use to explore wreck sites without alerting competition). 
 28. See Terry Aguayo, A Bountiful Undersea Find, Sure to Invite Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/us/19treasure.html (not-
ing the secrecy involved with the find of a shipwreck). 
 29. See Frances Robles, With Shipwreck Treasure Easier to Reach, a Duel Is On, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/us/with-ship-
wreck-treasure-easier-to-reach-a-duel-is-on.html (discussing “whether private compa-
nies should be able to claim and profit from historic treasures.”). 
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(“UNCLOS”).  I find that our underwater privacy regimes are extremely weak 
in the face of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (“UUV”) surveillance and that the 
regimes protect far fewer rights for entities operating at sea than for comparable 
entities on land.  I argue that judicial interpretation of privacy rights at sea to 
date has been dangerously eroded and that courts must strengthen these privacy 
protections before UUV surveillance becomes a maritime norm. 
I. PRIVACY AT SEA: THE LAY OF THE LAND 
The underwater environment is significantly different, both in legal gov-
ernance and in practical aspect, than the terrestrial environment that most are 
familiar with.  This Part addresses these differences, explaining what drone 
technologies exist currently as well as key aspects of the marine environments 
that they operate in.  In the maritime world, perhaps more so than any other, 
the environmental characteristics inform the legal regime.  Understanding these 
unique characteristics is critical to any analysis of the law governing this space. 
A. Drones at Sea: The Current State of the Field 
Aerial drones may be the more visible and prevalent form of drones cur-
rently, but maritime robots have been around for longer, making critical con-
tributions to the marine economy.30  Remote vessels at sea can be traced all the 
way back to 1898 when Nicholas Tesla demonstrated the first-ever use of radio 
waves to remotely control a moving object.31  The object that Tesla controlled 
in what some have called “the birth of modern robotics” was a boat floating on 
a pond in Madison Square Garden.32  This is illustrative not just of the long 
history of robots at sea but also of the important, but not necessarily intuitive, 
fact that in many key ways operating robots at sea is significantly easier than 
operating them on land.33  Water for the most part lacks the trees, rocks, or 
 
 30. G. R. Shaw, The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. 
Drones, UNDERSTANDING EMPIRE (2014), https://understandingempire.word-
press.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-s-drones/. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See James A.R. Nafziger, The Titanic Revisited, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 311, 
311 (1999). 
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other moving vehicles that make operation in terrestrial environments diffi-
cult.34  This combined with the operational need for innovative robotic tech-
nologies has led to a long and robust history of remotely controlled vehicles at 
sea.35 
Before delving into this history and the current capabilities of robots in 
the marine environment, a quick note on terminology is helpful.  For the pur-
poses of this Article, I will primarily be discussing underwater drones, or 
“[s]elf-propelled submersible[s] whose operation is either fully autonomous 
(pre-programmed or real-time adaptive mission control) or under minimal su-
pervisory control and is untethered except, possibly, for data links such as a 
fiber optic cable.”36  Like many emerging technologies, these autonomous sub-
mersibles are called many different things by different entities.  They are most 
commonly known as UUVs, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (“AUV”s), 
and ROVs.37  These all share the fundamental characteristics of being un-
manned mobile submersible vehicles.38  The differences between the catego-
ries lie in how they are controlled: remotely (ROVs – generally requiring a 
cable to the surface) or autonomously (AUVs).39  For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, I will use the broadest definitions – underwater drone or UUV – to en-
compass both remotely controlled and autonomous underwater vehicles.  In the 
few cases where the type of control a UUV is under matters to my legal con-
clusions, I make this clear. 
1. Characteristics of UUVs 
UUVs are already prevalent in the marine environment.  For many, oper-
ating robots at sea remains considerably easier than comparable operations on 
land.40  At the same time, despite our best efforts, the ocean remains a relatively 
 
 34. The current ongoing efforts to create self-driving cars illustrate this on-land 
complexity.  See John Markoff, A Guide to Challenges Facing Self-Driving Car Tech-
nologists, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/technol-
ogy/autonomous-car-technology-challenges.html. 
 35. See William J. Broad, Undersea Robots Open a New Age of Exploration, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/13/science/undersea-ro-
bots-open-a-new-age-of-exploration.html. 
 36. Henderson, supra note 13, at 56 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. DEP’T 
OF NAVY, THE NAVY UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE (UUV) MASTER PLAN 4 (2004), 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Stephanie Showalter, The Legal Status of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, 
38 MARINE TECH. SOC’Y J. 80, 80 (2004); see also Robert L. Wernli, AUV’s – The 
Maturity of the Technology, SPACE & NAVAL WARFARE SYS. CTR. (May 2000), 
http://auvac.org/uploads/publication_pdf/AUV’S%20-
%20The%20maturity%20of%20the%20technology.pdf. 
 40. For example, an autonomous car requires an extremely high degree of preci-
sion in its movements and reactions to successfully navigate crowded city streets.  See 
Norman Mayersohn, The Computer Chauffeur Is Creeping Closer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
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inaccessible environment for humans.  This may seem obvious, but the corol-
lary that follows is an important one: to reach the majority of the ocean, the 
only option has been to develop innovative technologies to support or replace 
human explorers.  Unlike terrestrial environments, where even the harshest en-
vironments are open to humans with the proper exposure protection, the ocean 
remains effectively closed without extensive life support systems – or as is in-
creasingly the case, without robotic equipment. 
This physical reality has had important consequences for the state of ro-
botics in the ocean.  While the development of autonomous systems specifi-
cally at sea has roughly followed the timeline we see on land, ROVs have ex-
isted in the marine environment and (uniquely) been used by non-military en-
tities for far longer.41  These ROVs have had crucial scientific,42 cultural,43 and 
military roles,44 from the discovery of the Titanic45 to widespread clearing of 
underwater mines.46  The sophistication in ROVs accreted over decades of use 
is crucial to understand, as it forms the basis for the explosion of semi-autono-
mous and autonomous UUVs that we see today.  ROVs have been developed 
to complete increasingly complex and specialized tasks; the addition of auton-
omous governing systems to this technological framework creates today’s 
UUVs.47 
It is helpful to think about the capabilities of undersea robots along four 
spectrums: sensory, manipulative, communication/control, and propulsion.  I 
delve into these capabilities here to illustrate clearly what exactly current 
UUVs can do. 
 
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/automobiles/the-computer-chauf-
feur-is-creeping-closer.html.  Contrast that with a UUV operating essentially alone in 
the midst of miles of water.  See Brendan Gogarty & Meredith Hagger, The Laws of 
Man over Vehicles Unmanned: The Legal Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land 
and Air, 19 J.L. INFO. & SCI. 73, 79 (2008).  Things are not always this simple, however, 
and strategic requirements generally will place drones in significantly more congested 
areas such as ports.  See id. at 92–93 (discussing increasingly advanced unmanned sur-
face vehicles that could operate in semi-autonomous mode and the use of UUVs in “all 
aspects” of the Navy). 
 41. Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 40, at 76–81 (describing the history of un-
manned vehicle development). 
 42. See, e.g., Wernli, supra note 6, at 392. 
 43. See, e.g., Ian Sample, New Technologies Bring Marine Archaeology Treasures 
to Light, GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sci-
ence/2016/dec/29/new-technologies-bring-marine-archaeology-treasures-to-light. 
 44. See, e.g., Daniel A.G. Vallejo, Note, Electric Currents: Programming Legal 
Status into Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
405, 408–09 (2015). 
 45. Nafziger, supra note 33, at 212. 
 46. Wernli, supra note 39; see also Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Contours of American 
Trade Secret Law: What Is and What Isn’t Protectable as a Trade Secret, 19 SMU SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 89 (2016). 
 47. See Wernli, supra note 6, at 392. 
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The longest standing and most complex use of ROVs in the undersea en-
vironment has been as passive sensing devices.48  The vast and opaque nature 
of the ocean has made this role particularly valuable for both commercial and 
militarily strategic purposes.49  Today, the majority of robots undersea are 
equipped with extensive sensory arrays.50  The most obvious of these are cam-
eras that capture the visual environment that the robot is operating in.  How-
ever, low light and high turbidity often combine in marine environments to 
yield very low visibility conditions.  This can be combatted with high-powered 
lights; however, bright lights have very high energy costs and may be imprac-
tical for long-term monitoring tasks.  Relying on vision often yields only a 
limited picture of underwater activities. 
The constraints on visual sensing in the marine environment mean that 
the majority of marine robots are equipped with significant additional sensory 
equipment.  The scope of this sensory equipment in turn significantly expands 
the scope of potential privacy violations.51  Sensory equipment varies greatly 
depending on the role of the robot, but standard marine robots are likely to be 
equipped with auditory, pressure, and temperature sensors in addition to more 
specialized equipment to determine the oxygen content, color, salinity, pH, and 
other standard oceanographic measures of the water surrounding the robot.52  
This data gives the robot a more comprehensive picture of the water column, 
the vertical stretch of water between the surface and the seafloor surrounding 
it, which is not only useful for information gathering purposes but is often also 
critical for the operation of the robot as it regulates its buoyancy.53  The average 
UUV today is equipped with a vast suite of sensory equipment able to collect 
highly detailed information about the environment around it, which raises sig-
nificant questions about what, if any, legal limits exist over what UUVs can 
monitor. 
In addition to the sensing capabilities of UUVs, much technological effort 
is currently focused on increasing the ways that undersea robots are able to 
actively engage with the environment around them.  Robots with sophisticated 
arms have been crucial tools in the recovery of treasure and other wreckage 
 
 48. See Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 40, at 79. 
 49. See Wrathall, supra note 5, at 234–35. 
 50. See, e.g., Virginia Tech Researchers Unveil Large Robotic Jellyfish that One 
Day Could Patrol Oceans, VA. TECH. DAILY (Apr. 3, 2013), 
https://www.vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2013/04/040313-engineering-robotjelly-
fishcyro.html. 
 51. Contrast this to the present situation with aerial drones, where visual privacy 
is far and away the largest privacy concern being discussed.  See, e.g., Calo, supra note 
16, at 30. 
 52. See, e.g., Flexible Design Supports Wide Range of Sensors and Payloads, 
LIQUID ROBOTICS, https://www.liquid-robotics.com/wave-glider/supported-sensors/ 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 53. See, e.g., id. 
9
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deep at sea.54  Commercial operators rely on similar robots to inspect and main-
tain deep-sea infrastructure.55  The capabilities of UUVs to interact with their 
surroundings vary greatly.56  While less interesting in the specific context of 
privacy, and therefore largely outside the scope of this Article, the manipula-
tive abilities of UUVs raise other significant legal questions, such as how vul-
nerable underwater communications networks are to attack.57 
Communication between UUVs and the surface is a unique challenge.  
Unlike aerial drones, many of which can be operated relatively simply with 
radio waves, underwater robots are much more difficult to reach with tradi-
tional signals.58  This hurdle has been overcome by tethering robots to a mother 
ship.59  This tether bundles power and communication lines to provide electric-
ity and communication signals to the robot.60  Tethers may also include steel 
(or Kevlar) cable to mechanically link the ROV to the surface ship and provide 
additional physical control, though this depends on the design and propulsion 
system of the robot.61  Tethered ROVs are inherently limited in their opera-
tional capabilities, however, as they cannot stray too far from the mother ship.  
This limitation has been perhaps the largest obstacle to more widespread UUV 
use to date. 
In recent years however, there has been an explosion in methods to un-
tether ROVs.  These methods take advantage of the rapid growth in robot au-
tonomy more broadly and generally require that UUVs operate semi-autono-
mously or autonomously,62 though methods that allow short-range communi-
cation with radio or acoustic signals are in development.63  The advent of au-
tonomous UUVs does away with the need for constant communication between 
 
 54. Yakov Malkiel, An Evolutionary Look at the Law, Technology, and Economics 
of Sunken Treasure, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 195, 202 (2013). 
 55. Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 40, at 104. 
 56. Compare Malkiel, supra note 54, at 202, with Markoff, supra note 7. 
 57. See, e.g., Wrathall, supra note 5, at 237–28. 
 58. See Rick Robinson, On Their Own, GA. TECH RESEARCH HORIZONS (2015), 
http://www.rh.gatech.edu/features/their-own. 
 59. Wrathall, supra note 5, at 237–38. 
 60. D. RICHARD BLIDBERG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER 
VEHICLES (AUV): A BRIEF SUMMARY 2 (2001), http://ausi.org/publica-
tions/ICRA_01paper.pdf. 
 61. Romano Capocci et al., Inspection-Class Remotely Operated Vehicles – A Re-
view, 5 J. MARINE SCI. & ENGINEERING 1, 9–11 (2017). 
 62. Vallejo, supra note 44, at 409. 
 63. See Stefania Giodini et al., Can I Communicate with My AUV?, HYDRO INT’L 
(July 26, 2016), https://www.hydro-international.com/content/article/can-i-communi-
cate-with-my-auv (discussing what factors can impact underwater acoustic communi-
cations based on information derived from sea trials). 
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a human and the robot, allowing it to travel untethered and under its own au-
tonomous control.64  Semi-autonomous robots generally surface at pre-deter-
mined intervals and are able to communicate with shore-based controllers dur-
ing these times.65  These surface intervals allow the UUV not only to download 
any new operational instructions but also to transmit the data it has gathered 
back to shore via satellite.66  Depending on the operational goals of the robot, 
these intervals may need to be relatively frequent if the amount of data being 
gathered exceeds the storage capacity of the robot or if frequent changes in 
mission are expected.  Once an untethered robot is submerged, it is effectively 
unreachable, rendering the pre-planning of regular surface communication in-
tervals a crucial element of UUV control. 
The last key technological piece that is important to understand when dis-
cussing UUVs is propulsion.  UUVs can be divided into two main propulsion 
categories: active and passive.  Actively propelled robots use battery technol-
ogy to power propulsive systems.67  Their ranges are inherently limited by the 
size of the batteries powering them.  However, these UUVs have been the ben-
eficiaries of recent improvements in battery technology, allowing them to 
travel far greater distances than in the past.68  Sophisticated buoyancy technol-
ogies further require very little energy to allow UUVs to actively move up and 
down in the water column.69  The result of these advances in technology has 
created current models that are capable of operating underwater for up to thirty 
days – previously unheard of durations.70 
The potential for long-term deployments is even higher for passively pro-
pelled robots.  Passively propelled robots are a more recent development but 
have generated a great deal of interest, particularly from military and scientific 
parties who are interested in their long-term data collection capacities.71  These 
passively propelled UUVs use power generated by waves or other energy 
around them to move throughout the water column, opening the possibility for 
 
 64. See Greg Mone, Untethered in the Deep, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 18, 2007), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/409266/untethered-in-the-deep/ (“[AUVs] can 
cover large areas without constant monitoring – and they don’t require a large surface 
vessel to launch them, or trained operators on board to pilot them.”). 
 65. Oscar Schofield et al., The Robot Ocean Network, AM. SCIENTIST (2013), 
https://www.americanscientist.org/article/the-robot-ocean-network. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Wrathall, supra note 5, at 238. 
 68. Jeffrey Lin & P.W. Singer, Not A Shark, But a Robot: Chinese University Tests 
Long-Range Unmanned Mini Sub, POPULAR SCI. (June 4, 2014), http://www.pop-
sci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/not-shark-robot-chinese-university-tests-long-
range-unmanned-mini-sub. 
 69. Salimzhan A. Gafurov & Evgeniy V. Klochkov, Autonomous Unmanned Un-
derwater Vehicles Development Tendencies, 106 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 141, 142–43 
(2015). 
 70. Id.; see also Vallejo, supra note 44, at 406. 
 71. See Drone to Police Massive UK Marine Reserve, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35783564. 
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extremely long-range missions.72  Taken together, the advent of more advanced 
battery technologies as well as passive propulsion methods for UUVs has cre-
ated a reality where very few areas of the surface ocean are out of reach for 
UUVs. 
2. Uses of UUVs 
Having set out some of the key characteristics of current marine robots, I 
now turn to a brief overview of who is using these robots and how.  Under-
standing these uses presents the crucial background for an inquiry into how 
UUV operation may infringe on existing marine privacy rights and commercial 
confidentiality.  Military, commercial, and scientific users all have longstand-
ing relationships with ROVs and are expanding their operations significantly 
as UUV technologies improve.  Recreational users, additionally, are relatively 
new UUV users but are increasingly common as UUVs become more prevalent 
and affordable. 
a. Military 
The military is by far the longest standing and most pervasive user of 
robots in the marine environment.73  Military UUVs have a variety of purposes; 
the most traditional (and most obvious) is surveillance.74  Just as manned sub-
marines have been a crucial part of the military’s intelligence-gathering strat-
egy, so too have unmanned submersibles become invaluable for their ability to 
collect information discretely.75  The advantages of using unmanned submers-
ibles for information gathering are relatively clear – their smaller form and 
ability to travel great distances without the need to surface are obvious strategic 
advantages for reconnaissance operations.  There are also no concerns about 
loss or capture of human life if unmanned submersibles are sent into hostile 
 
 72. Id.  It is worth noting that despite the apparent similarities, these passively 
propelled robots are significantly different than traditional and widespread oceano-
graphic drifter “floats.”  While floats, such as the ARGO floats that have been deployed 
by NOAA in the hundreds over the last decade to monitor basic ocean chemistry, en-
gage in many of the sensing and communication functions that robots do, they are dis-
tinct from robots in that they are uncontrollable.  See Thayer Walker, Wave-Powered 
Monitor Is Moving Beyond Listening to Whales, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/science/24wave.html.  Oceanographic floats 
drift with the ocean’s currents and are incapable of moving to specific locations or ma-
nipulating the environment around them.  Id. 
 73. Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 40, at 78. 
 74. Henderson, supra note 13, at 57. 
 75. See U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, THE NAVY UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE (UUV) 
MASTER PLAN 9 (2004), https://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf 
(“UUVs are uniquely suited for information collection due to their ability to operate at 
long standoff distances, operate in shallow water areas, operate autonomously, and pro-
vide a level of clandestine capability not available with other systems.”). 
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areas.  However, there are significant disadvantages to using UUVs for surveil-
lance.  In December 2016, a U.S. UUV was captured at sea by the Chinese 
military, sparking an international furor.76  The features that make UUVs most 
attractive for long-term undetected missions also make them uniquely prone to 
capture – small size and semi-autonomous operation that may not allow for 
effective escape maneuvering, for starters.  Hostile capture incidents are likely 
to increase further as UUV usage continues to escalate in coming decades. 
In addition to surveillance, the U.S. military has capitalized on the un-
manned nature of UUVs to use them for abnormally dangerous activities, such 
as minesweeping.77  The potential military and strategic value of UUVs is the 
subject of significant research efforts to broaden the UUV’s scope of action to 
include defensive measures (including both minesweeping and anti-submarine 
warfare), offensive measures (weapons delivery), as well as the traditional in-
formation gathering (and more recently deception) role.78 
b. Commercial 
Commercial interests primarily use robots in oil and mineral exploration, 
installation of underwater infrastructure, and salvage work.79  In these environ-
ments, where it is extremely costly and sometimes impossible to reach equip-
ment with manned submersibles or divers, UUVs are essential.  Significant 
research and development (“R&D”) in commercial robots over time in re-
sponse to these needs has yielded sophisticated UUVs that are capable of car-
rying out diverse and complex tasks, from mechanical maintenance of deep-
sea structures to sophisticated data collection about the seabed.80  UUVs are 
also used to conduct underwater geological and archaeological surveys, to as-
sess the viability of undersea cable routes, and to discover deep-sea wrecks.81  
Current estimates project a forty-two percent increase in the commercial UUV 
industry between 2014 and 2018.82 
c. Scientific 
The scientific community, while less well-funded than the military or 
commercial sectors, has also found extensive uses for UUVs.  These robots 
 
 76. See Harriet Agerholm, China Seizes US Navy Underwater Drone in Interna-
tional Waters of South China Sea, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-seize-us-navy-underwater-vehicle-south-china-
sea-one-china-taiwan-a7480016.html. 
 77. Henderson, supra note 13, at 58. 
 78. Id. at 57–58. 
 79. Id. at 57. 
 80. Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 40, at 104–05. 
 81. Henderson, supra note 13, at 57. 
 82. Global AUV Fleet to Increase 42% by 2018, WESTWOOD GLOBAL ENERGY 
GROUP (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.westwoodenergy.com/news/press-release/press-re-
lease-global-auv-fleet-to-increase-42-by-2018/. 
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have been invaluable in gathering information about the marine environment 
beyond what is attainable from oceanographic research vessels.83  One ROV 
alone, the storied Alvin, is responsible for confirming deep-sea ridge spreading 
(and thus solidifying the theory of plate tectonics), discovering the existence 
of hydrothermal vent communities (arguably the largest oceanographic discov-
ery of the last century), and discovering the sunken wreck of the Titanic, among 
other things.84 
Scientists have been the major force behind the creation of passively pow-
ered UUVs.85  Major gaps currently exist in our scientific understanding of the 
ocean environment, particularly open ocean and deep-sea ecosystems.86  This 
is in part due to the relative inaccessibility of these areas – fully staffed scien-
tific research cruises can cost over $50,000 per day.87  Comparatively, newly 
developed, passively propelled drones cost less up front and can be deployed 
for years at a time.88  These drones have the potential to dramatically advance 
scientific understanding of ocean ecosystems. 
d. Recreational 
The world of recreational UUV use is a very new one.  While commercial 
and military robots have been heavily used for decades due to necessity, there 
have been few reasons for the general public to use underwater vehicles.  Re-
cently, however, the proliferation of aerial drones combined with lower costs 
for undersea submersibles has opened this market to recreational users.  While 
companies manufacturing low-cost underwater drones have generated a great 
deal of media interest, there are still relatively few actually being used by the 
general public.89  Despite this, diverse groups, notably journalists and citizen 
scientists, have expressed interest in more widespread availability and use of 
 
 83. 20,000 Colleagues Under the Sea, ECONOMIST (June 9, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2012/06/09/20000-colleagues-
under-the-sea. 
 84. Human Occupied Vehicle Alvin, NOAA, http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/tech-
nology/subs/alvin/alvin.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  Alvin is a submersible that 
is capable of carrying passengers, but it also utilized a robotic vehicle in its work on 
the Titanic.  Id. 
 85. See Walker, supra note 72. 
 86. See Brueck, supra note 4. 
 87. Rex Dalton, US Ocean-Research Projects in Dire Economic Straits, NATURE 
(Apr. 30, 2008), https://www.nature.com/news/2008/080430/full/453007a.html. 
 88. See, e.g., IBUBBLE, https://ibubble.camera/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019); 
OPENROV, https://www.openrov.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 89. See Marnette Federis, Growing Popularity of Underwater Drones Raises Sim-
ilar Concerns as Aerial Counterparts, CAP. PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2016), 
http://www.capradio.org/articles/2016/07/01/growing-popularity-of-underwater-
drones-raises-new-questions/ (discussing how OpenRov hopes to increase the number 
of eyes underwater). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/6
2019] SECRETS OF THE DEEP 61 
undersea drones.90  Current models range from exploratory ROVs intended to 
allow land-based observation of underwater features91 to AUV models meant 
to follow and film divers while they are underwater.92 
Looking at the diverse capabilities of drones currently and the many en-
tities using them, the future for robots at sea is strong.  As UUVs are increas-
ingly untethered and autonomous, the options are nearly limitless.  Market es-
timates predict the UUV industry will be $5.2 billion by 2022.93 
B. The Marine Environment 
Understanding the capabilities of UUVs helps us to understand how these 
robots can and do operate at sea.  To determine how they may infringe on pri-
vacy and commercial interests at sea, we first need to consider what exactly 
these other interests at sea are.  In the case of the opaque marine environment, 
these entities are not always readily apparent either literally or figuratively.  In 
this Section, I briefly review the most relevant entities operating in the oceans 
today and their key operational features as background for understanding what 
privacy rights these entities may have. 
The most obvious, and most prevalent, entities at sea are ships.  Over 
87,000 merchant ships alone are operating on the ocean as of the time this Ar-
ticle was written; this number increases dramatically when naval and fishing 
vessels are added to the equation.94  Ships at the most basic level share the 
characteristic of being an enclosed hull capable of moving through the water.  
Beyond this, ship design and use varies dramatically depending on the type and 
purpose of the vessel.  In some cases, vessels move expeditiously through the 
oceans, not stopping and with minimal activity taking place in the water around 
the ship (cruise ships and merchant shipping vessels, for instance).95  In other 
cases, ships stop frequently, deploying gear and interacting actively and openly 
with the ocean environment around them (fishing vessels, research vessels, and 
 
 90. See, e.g., Activities & Applications, OPENROV, https://www.openrov.com/ap-
plications/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019) (advertising robotic use to check for fishing spots 
or for maintenance on citizen boat). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id.; IBUBBLE, supra note 88. 
 93. Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) Market Worth 5.20 Billion USD by 
2022, MARKETSANDMARKETS, http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/un-
manned-underwater-vehicles.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 94. Craig Jallal, How Many Ships Are There in the World?, SHIPPING RES. & FIN. 
(July 31, 2012), https://shippingresearch.wordpress.com/2012/07/31/how-many-ships-
are-there-in-the-world/. 
 95. It should not be ignored, however, that while ships may seem to be relatively 
isolated from the water around them, significant discharge of water and other waste 
byproducts occurs from these vessels.  See OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT., U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-800-R-11-001, GRAYWATER DISCHARGES FROM 
VESSELS 6 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vgp_graywater.pdf. 
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oil and gas tenders).  Exactly how a vessel operates has significant implications 
for the attendant privacy concerns the vessel and its crew are likely to have. 
Regardless of the type of ship, a great deal of information about the ship’s 
operations can be gleaned from the water around it.  Ships are constantly taking 
on seawater and discharging this raw water as exhaust, bilge, and gray water.96  
Analyzing the chemical composition of these fluids can reveal many details of 
how and for what purpose a ship is being run, including revealing criminal 
activity and regulatory non-compliance.97  Additional information can be 
gleaned from the acoustic signature of a ship – a fact that submarines have long 
taken advantage of.98  Thus, while visual observation of a ship’s hull may be 
what we first think of when considering privacy rights in the ocean, there is a 
far vaster, and more interesting, suite of information potentially observable.  
This information is likely to be available regardless of whether a ship stops 
frequently and puts gear over the side or never stops and all operations remain 
completely contained inside the vessel. 
Aside from ships, the majority of remaining property in the ocean is com-
mercial infrastructure.99  These installations take the form of oil and gas drill-
ing rigs, undersea pipelines, aquaculture facilities, and undersea mining and 
offshore renewable energy generation, among others.100  This subsea economy 
is a large and growing one – in 1998, the industry was $4.9 billion; by 2003 it 
had more than doubled to nearly $12 billion.101  Like vessels, how these com-
mercial installations interact with the environment around them has large im-
plications for their privacy rights.  Also, like vessels, the level of environmental 
interaction differs significantly depending not only on the type of installation 
but also on the specific installation itself.  While many commercial operations 
interact with the ocean environment in ways that are visually obvious to ob-
servers – be it through setting out fishing nets or drilling into the ocean crust – 
there are also installations where the purpose is largely invisible to visual ob-
servation.102  From a trade secret perspective, UUVs present one of the first 
 
 96. See Cruise Ship Discharges and Studies, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/vessels-
marinas-and-ports/cruise-ship-discharges-and-studies (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 97. See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (noting generally the identification of an unauthorized oil discharge 
by a cruise ship). 
 98. See Gareth Evans, Understanding Acoustic Signatures, NAVAL TECH. (Oct. 
20, 2017), https://www.naval-technology.com/features/understanding-acoustic-signa-
tures/.  The “acoustic signature” is “the noise and vibrations a vessel and its on-board 
equipment and systems make in the water.”  Id. 
 99. There is also military infrastructure, but the size and extent of these installa-
tions remains largely unknown (for now – increased UUV use has the potential to 
change this) due to military secrecy combined with the operational opacity of the ocean.  
See Wrathall, supra note 5, at 234. 
 100. See, e.g., HOEGH-GULDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 23; Wernli, supra note 
6, at 391. 
 101. Wernli, supra note 6, at 391. 
 102. See Wrathall, supra note 5, at 234. 
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opportunities for the activities engaged in by these entities to be seen and mon-
itored by outside observers through non-visual sensory devices. 
Private property interests also exist less frequently in the form of land 
leases.103  Outright ownership of the ocean and the seafloor beyond the twelve 
nautical mile territorial limits is prohibited under UNCLOS.104  Within twelve 
miles from shore, ownership of the seafloor, but not the water itself, may be 
allowed under U.S. law.105  Ownership of submerged lands is generally granted 
to states within three miles of the coastline and the federal government in the 
zone from three to twelve miles.106  State laws vary, but the majority allow the 
leasing of subsea lands within their jurisdictions, though any subsea leases are 
subject to the restrictions of the Public Trust Doctrine.107  The federal govern-
ment also allows leasing of submerged lands under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act.108  These leases grant possessory, use, and sometimes exclusionary 
rights, but by nature they are inherently more limited than full private property 
rights.109 
The last important entities at sea are people themselves.  While limited in 
our ability to be in the ocean without being physically inside a vessel, recrea-
tional diving is a popular enough endeavor that these interests should not be 
overlooked.  When people spend time in the ocean, they are likely to do so in 
places that are relatively busy from a marine perspective.110  Popular, coastal 
dive sites can see hundreds of divers a day.111  Recreational UUVs are already 
being marketed to divers; and some of them are able to follow divers autono-
mously throughout a dive while taking video footage.112  It is a short step from 
 
 103. See Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding 
Property Rights and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 341 (2006). 
 104. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 400 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  The United States follows these provisions de-
spite not ratifying UNCLOS.  David L. Larson, National Security Aspects of the United 
States Extension of the Territorial Sea to Twelve Nautical Miles, 2 TERR. SEA J. 189, 
216–17 (1992). 
 105. See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 72 (2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/docu-
ments/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf. 
 106. Id. at 70–72. 
 107. Osherenko, supra note 103, at 345–48. 
 108. Id. at 354. 
 109. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The lease 
does convey a property interest enforceable against the Government, of course, but it 
is an interest lacking many of the attributes of private property.”). 
 110. See Survey Shows Where Boaters Go and How They Spend Time, Money, 
MARCO, http://portal.midatlanticocean.org/ocean-stories/recreational-boating/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 111. See David Zakai & Nanette E. Chadwick-Furman, Impacts of Intensive Recre-
ational Diving on Reef Corals at Eilat, Northern Red Sea, 105 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 179, 185 (discussing the recommend number of dives per site per year 
and recommending a 5,000–6,000 cap for Eilat location).  
 112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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this to governmental UUVs being used to monitor dive sites and ensure divers 
are not breaking any environmental regulations. 
Looking at the larger picture of UUV operation in the marine environ-
ment, two trends are clear: technological improvements are allowing UUVs to 
reach places with surveillance methods unprecedented in the history of the op-
erationally opaque ocean, while at the same time human military, commercial, 
and recreational uses of the ocean are burgeoning.  The ocean is thus rapidly 
becoming more crowded with entities that are not necessarily used to sharing 
their space.  UUVs in particular present real surveillance threats as commercial, 
military, and recreational users increasingly seek to use them to glean infor-
mation about the surrounding ocean environment.  The strategic and commer-
cial value of this information is extremely high: the operational difficulties of 
the ocean mean that any gains in efficiency are hard-won but have huge pay-
offs.  UUVs have the potential to contribute vast swaths of new information to 
these efforts, from observations of ocean conditions themselves to better un-
derstandings of how other operations at sea maximize their operational pro-
cesses. 
II. PRIVACY AT SEA UNDER U.S. LAW 
Underwater drones are increasingly common and increasingly capable.113  
These technologies are opening the world’s oceans to new commercial and rec-
reational players while greatly expanding the capabilities of those already op-
erating in the oceans.  In the face of this growth, major questions exist about 
what, if any, rights marine operators have to conduct their affairs without ex-
ternal surveillance.  In this Part, I address this question in the context of U.S. 
law.  I first look to what privacy rights exist under U.S. private law, assessing 
specifically how private property rights and privacy interact in the ocean.  I 
then turn to the broader privacy rights that may be afforded under U.S. public 
law with an analysis of how the Fourth Amendment applies to governmental 
surveillance at sea.  I look in both these cases at the differing rights afforded to 
private and commercial marine operators.  I argue that existing privacy rights 
at sea have been unconstitutionally eroded. This will only be exacerbated by 
the advent of UUVs, which provide an important opportunity to redress past 
judicial erosions of privacy protections by recognizing and solidifying marine 
privacy rights. 
Our current laws evolved when privacy at sea was virtually guaranteed 
by environmental conditions.  No additional regulation was needed to protect 
these interests.  Only in recent years has the potential for privacy invasions 
become a reality in the marine environment through UUV use.  We are now in 
the mismatched situation where technological capabilities have advanced rap-
idly, allowing robots to enter the marine environment, before any legal regime 
exists to effectively limit their operation.  In its current form, U.S. law allows 
 
 113. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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surveillance in the marine realm that would clearly be considered unconstitu-
tional terrestrially.114  Before UUV use increases further, this discrepancy must 
be remedied to ensure that privacy interests at sea are adequately protected in 
the future. 
A. Underwater Privacy Under U.S. Private Law 
In the world of aerial drones, where privacy issues have been numerous 
and contentious, tort claims provide a major potential avenue of recovery.115  
U.S. tort law is also the umbrella under which underwater privacy infringe-
ments by non-governmental actors using UUVs will be evaluated.  I turn first 
to these protections provided by tort law, drawing analogies both from aerial 
drone use as well as from related maritime contexts.  U.S. tort law provides 
explicit privacy protections through the “privacy torts” of intrusion upon se-
clusion, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and appropriation of 
name.116  In addition to these, the tort doctrines of trespass and nuisance also 
contribute heavily to our understanding of privacy rights through their deline-
ation of the limits of personal property.  These doctrines have proven to be 
some of the most essential in establishing the extent of privacy infringement 
by aerial drones,117 and thus, it is these I turn to first in analyzing the marine 
analogs.  I find that trespass and nuisance actions are both unlikely to be cog-
nizable in most cases in the marine environment, but some protections for com-
mercial entities may exist from UUV observation under trade secret law. 
1. Trespass and Nuisance 
Trespass actions protect the rights of property owners from invasion by 
third parties.  While trespass is not explicitly a cause of action that protects 
privacy rights, it does so by proxy, as it prevents entry into privately owned 
areas.  On land, trespass is a relatively cut and dried action: entry without per-
mission onto another’s privately owned land is trespass.118  This tort requires 
actual entry onto private land – threatening to enter or hovering at the bounda-
ries of private property is not sufficient to create a trespass.119  However, once 
entry onto another’s land has occurred, a trespass action is cognizable whether 
 
 114. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 115. See generally Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
155 (2015). 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 
2018). 
 117. See A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots 
and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24–27 (2015) (discussing what constitutes aerial tres-
pass). 
 118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. 
 119. Id. 
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or not any damages arise as a result of the trespass.120  In practice, this means 
that the mere presence of a drone in the air above private property is sufficient 
to form the basis for a trespass claim if the drone is low enough to be effectively 
within the bounds of private property.121 
Determining exactly how far above and below the surface these private 
rights extend, however, has been a touchstone issue in debates about aerial 
drones.122  The property rights associated with land ownership are generally 
thought to extend upwards to “as much of the space above the ground as []he 
can occupy or use in connection with the land.”123  Thus, intrusions into the 
immediate reaches of the airspace above the land are considered trespass in the 
same way that intrusions directly onto the land itself would be.124  In terrestrial 
contexts, this prevents aerial drones from operating in very low airspace areas 
– 83 feet above the land in the landmark Causby case – with the general limit 
to these private property rights hovering somewhere around 100 feet above the 
ground.125 
Similar rights to own (or lease) land and chattels exist in the marine en-
vironment.  Private parties may own (or, more often, lease) portions of the sea-
floor as well as vessels and other structures in the water column itself.126  These 
private parties have property rights that prevent trespass onto their vessels and 
structures just as they would onto land.127  In cases where UUVs use manipu-
lative capabilities to physically interfere with vessels or leased land parcels, a 
trespass action would be cognizable underwater just as it is terrestrially.  How-
ever, this is unlikely to be a frequent occurrence: UUVs are primarily used for 
their passive sensing capabilities. 
The more interesting question, and the more important one from a privacy 
standpoint, is how far property rights extend in the water column around pri-
vate property.  Whether a UUV can get within inches of a leased piece of sea-
floor and undertake surveillance or whether it has to stay hundreds of feet 
above it has critical implications for privacy.  Courts have not yet had the oc-
casion to decide of the limits of property rights in the marine environment, so 
here I look to the terrestrial regime as a possible analogue. 
In the case of seafloor ownership, some private property rights should 
extend above the seabed.  Just as terrestrial property is usually populated with 
buildings, marine operations leasing land at sea generally build structures that 
extend above the seafloor.128  Both the airspace above terrestrial plots and the 
 
 120. Id.  However, some courts are unlikely to honor these claims of “technical 
trespass.”   See Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 117, at 23, 27–29. 
 121. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
 122. See Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 117, at 26. 
 123. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 124. MCNEAL, supra note 16, at 8. 
 125. Causby, 328 U.S. at 263–64. 
 126. See Osherenko, supra note 103, at 318, 353. 
 127. These rights are subject to the Coast Guard’s statutory right to board, among 
other things discussed infra Section II.B. 
 128. A drilling rig would be a common example. 
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water above seafloor leases is public space, however, on land, courts have rec-
ognized that an extension of the privacy rights upward into the airspace is nec-
essary to ensure the “owner’s full enjoyment of the property.”129  At sea, those 
leasing the seafloor are likely entitled to the same legal protections.  Just as 
terrestrial buildings need a buffer of privacy rights around them, so too should 
marine operations have privacy rights that extend above the seafloor to ensure 
their full use of the property.  These rights on land have been recognized both 
for commercial and residential structures, and so too should both types of struc-
tures at sea have attendant private property rights.  However, determining the 
extent of these privacy rights beyond the seafloor presents a significantly dif-
ferent problem in the marine realm than terrestrially. 
The marine environment makes the upper limit of property rights above 
the seafloor much more difficult to determine than on land.  Terrestrially, 
houses are rarely taller than two stories while skyscrapers may reach 300 feet.  
Property rights above structures are proportional to these heights.  However, 
distances are vastly different at sea.  Seafloor leases are routinely occupied by 
drilling rigs or other structures that may stretch from the surface of the ocean 
to the seafloor – often thousands of feet.  In these cases, applying land ana-
logues is less helpful.  If commercial installations routinely occupy the entire 
water column above leased land, one interpretation could be that property 
rights above the seafloor should extend to the surface.  But extending property 
rights above seafloor parcels as far as the surface is directly at war with the fact 
that the water column is, by definition, not subject to private ownership.130  Be-
cause of this, privacy rights above the seafloor are unlikely to extend upwards 
in tandem with the structures on them as on land.  Instead, private property 
rights associated with seafloor leases in some cases may extend upwards to the 
limit of the structures placed on the seafloor (if these structures do not extend 
upwards more than a couple hundred feet).  In other cases, where structures 
extend all the way from seafloor leases to the surface, courts are ultimately 
unlikely to find any extension of property rights at all.  Freedom of navigation 
is enshrined throughout both U.S. and international law,131 and any attempt to 
restrict free access to the water column would present serious conflicts with 
this doctrine.  Ultimately, structures in the water column that are in some way 
attached to a seafloor lease but far distant from it may have closer analogs in 
vessels or other mobile property that is located throughout the water column. 
At sea, the majority of private property is not fixed to the seafloor or as-
sociated in any way with real property leases.  Looking at cases of private prop-
erty in the water column itself (e.g., vessels, fixed buoys, and fishing traps), 
the property in question is not real property.  Instead, these chattels are not 
attached, legally or physically, to any particular piece of land.  The terrestrial 
analogues here are to things like cars rather than houses.  American courts have 
found that people do not have any reasonable expectation of privacy around 
 
 129. Causby, 328 U.S. at 265. 
 130. See Osherenko, supra note 103, at 341. 
 131. Id. 
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cars or other private property that is located in public areas.132  If this is trans-
lated to the maritime world, it appears, at first glance, that no buffer zone of 
ownership and its attendant bar on trespass should exist around vessels and 
other maritime property that are not real property. 
But the maritime world may not be directly analogous to land in this case.  
Certain military and commercial structures at sea are afforded legal protection 
in the form of exclusion zones around them.133  These exclusion zones are in-
tended to ensure the safety both of the commercial installations and of any ves-
sels operating near them.134  Exclusion zones do not carry with them explicit 
private property rights over the water or any submerged lands, though they do 
grant lessees exclusionary rights, widely understood to be part of the property 
“bundle” of rights.135  This right is sufficient to serve as the grounds for a tres-
pass action if there is intrusion into an exclusion zone.136 
While these exclusion zones do create the potential for trespass actions, 
the more difficult question is whether exclusion zones may be indicative of a 
different norm in how marine property is understood.  Widespread exclusion 
zones around structures and vessels could support the opposite finding from 
that on land: that property rights in chattels may extend to the area around them.  
This is unlikely to be the case.  If anything, needing to alter the existing regime 
to create extra protections through exclusion zones suggests that this level of 
protection is uncommon and unnecessary for most purposes.  Exclusion zones 
stand out from the normal legal regime and suggest that buffers around struc-
tures at sea must be explicitly created in order to be enforceable.  Similar anal-
ogies exist on land, where safety zones may be placed around dangerous in-
dustrial facilities.  In these cases, safety zones do not indicate a norm of private 
property rights.  Thus, in the marine world, privacy buffers around structures 
and vessels are unlikely to be upheld. 
It is important to remember that these areas immediately adjacent to pri-
vate property are likely to be crucial areas for underwater surveillance.  Under-
water visibility is much more restricted than visibility in the air.  As such, the 
only viable locations for visual surveillance will be directly next to an under-
water object.  Understanding the limits of property rights then is critical in that 
sense – on land, binoculars or sophisticated commercial cameras can be used 
to observe from a distance,137 but this is simply not a possibility in much of the 
ocean.  This is not to say that visual surveillance is the only option.  Underwater 
 
 132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 133. See Osherenko, supra note 103, at 319 (listing statutory exclusion zones). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 332. 
 136. See id.  In fact, the existence of exclusion zones alone may make trespass ac-
tions particularly difficult to prove in the immediate vicinity of structures that do not 
have them.  It is easy to imagine a court viewing the lack of an exclusion zone as evi-
dence of the lack of privacy rights. 
 137. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986). 
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drones are likely to obtain their most interesting information from other sen-
sory equipment.  However, in cases where visual imagery is needed, underwa-
ter drones realistically may need to be within (much) less than fifty feet of an 
object to obtain usable images. 
The extent of private property rights thus forms an important element of 
privacy protections at sea.  Unclear limits on private property coupled with the 
location of maritime structures in waters that are ultimately public suggest that 
trespass is unlikely to be a productive legal claim except in cases where UUVs 
physically interfere with structures or leased parcels of land.  In cases of mere 
surveillance, trespass is unlikely to be cognizable even when the observation 
is occurring from waters directly next to a marine structure. 
In cases where activities do not directly interfere with private property or 
support a trespass claim, plaintiffs often turn to a nuisance claim.  Nuisance 
claims can be brought when a private party’s “interest in the private use and 
enjoyment” is infringed upon by a third party.138  This is a much broader cause 
of action than trespass and one that may potentially be open to those seeking 
redress from observation by underwater drones.  Bringing a successful nui-
sance claim requires showing that the actions in question substantially inter-
fered with the use of the property, however.139  In the context of drones at sea, 
this may be difficult to show.  Except in the most egregious cases, a drone that 
simply hovers close to another vessel or structure, passively observing, is un-
likely to cause the kind of disturbance that is traditionally associated with nui-
sance claims.140  There has been relatively clear consensus that in the case of 
aerial drones, unwanted observation, in and of itself, would not provide the 
grounds for a viable nuisance claim.141 This same principle should hold true 
for drones in the marine environment. 
2. Other Private Law Protections 
The “privacy torts” are less likely to be applicable in protecting privacy 
at sea than simple trespass claims.  Tortious invasion of privacy may occur in 
cases of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private 
facts, false light, and appropriation.142  For present purposes, the only one of 
these likely to limit drone operation at sea is intrusion upon seclusion.  Intru-
sion upon seclusion may be shown when there is an intrusion upon a reasonable 
expectation of seclusion and the intrusion would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person.143  What constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy at sea 
 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 
2018). 
 139. Id. § 821F (“There is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it causes 
significant harm . . . .”). 
 140. See Benjamin D. Matthews, Comment, Potential Tort Liability for Personal 
Use of Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L. J. 573, 594 (2015). 
 141. Id. 
 142. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 26, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018). 
 143. Id. § 34. 
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is discussed in detail below in the context of the Fourth Amendment.  Here it 
is sufficient to note that in cases where private matters are observed by drones 
(e.g., on boats that the owners use as homes), parties may have a cause of action 
under this tort.  However, it is unlikely that this could be used more broadly as 
a privacy protection for commercial interests. 
Facts that are gleaned with UUVs and subsequently publicized may also 
form the basis for actions based on public disclosure of private information.  
Additional party-specific privacy protections may be available based on the 
specific circumstances. 
3. Laws Applying to Commercial Entities 
Finally, there is a set of protections that are only potentially relevant for 
commercial maritime interests – those that protect trade secrets.  Commercial 
operations at sea may be using proprietary methods, equipment, or techniques 
that they have developed to maximize their economic efficiency in the difficult 
ocean operating environment.  Observation of these methods by UUVs could 
reveal to other commercial or private entities information that hurts companies 
economically and allows proprietary methods to be distributed widely.  Trade 
secrets law may protect companies in these cases. 
Historically, trade secrets were protected through tort law’s cause of ac-
tion for misappropriation of trade secrets.144  In an effort to improve and stand-
ardize trade secret protection, the common law tort cause of action has today 
been superseded by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in all but three 
states.145  Because of its nearly universal adoption I will focus on the protec-
tions provided by the UTSA with the caveat that specific state interpretations 
will vary depending on their own historical relationship with the UTSA.146 
Under the UTSA, for information to be considered a trade secret it must 
be information, “including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process,” that “derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily as-
certainable by proper means” and “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”147 
Processes, techniques, and equipment used by commercial marine opera-
tions should fall in the category of “a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
 
 144. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 
2018). 
 145. Legislative Fact Sheet – Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
https://perma.cc/W38B-8Q7E (captured Apr. 6, 2018).  Those states are Massachusetts, 
New York, and North Carolina.  Id. 
 146. Interpretation will vary even more so in North Carolina – one of the states that 
has not yet adopted the UTSA and has significant coastal resources.  See id. 
 147. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
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device, method, technique, or process” protected by the UTSA.148  Courts in-
terpret this provision of the UTSA broadly: it is considered a non-exhaustive 
list, and courts have included in this category other types of information as 
distinct from “methods and devices,” such as customer lists.149  The operations 
of commercial maritime entities, including their equipment, techniques, and 
methods, are thus also likely to be included. 
However, this conclusion is less clear when it comes to some of the most 
valuable information held by commercial marine operations – the exact loca-
tion they are operating in.  For many fixed structures, such as mining operations 
and oil and gas drilling, their general operating locations are available as part 
of the leases they are required to obtain.150  However, within these leases, the 
exact location of resource deposits often remains unclear as commercial enti-
ties develop multiple exploratory mines or wells before beginning full resource 
extraction.151  Locational information is even less available for mobile entities, 
such as fishing vessels and commercial shippers, whose exact routes represent 
highly valuable commercial information.  While some fishing vessels in the 
United States are required to disclose their location to the government to aid in 
fisheries management, the government in turn guarantees that this information 
will not be disclosed to any other entities.152  Despite this guarantee, many 
fishermen still disclose incorrect information to the government out of fear that 
their secret fishing locations will be made available to competing parties.153  
Past National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) rule-
makings that implement increasingly stringent monitoring requirements for 
fishing vessels have generated many comments concerned with the potential 
release of trade secrets as part of new monitoring regimes that require location 
disclosures.154  Terrestrially, some courts have recognized that the exact loca-
tion of potential oil fields is a trade secret.155  Extending this to the marine 
realm and considering the non-exhaustive definitions in the UTSA, locational 
 
 148. See id. 
 149. See Dole, Jr., supra note 46, at 94 & n.28. 
 150. See Offshore Oil & Gas, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://reve-
nuedata.doi.gov/how-it-works/offshore-oil-gas/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CG-4100N (08-
07), NAT’L VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEM (N-VMS) DATA NON-DISCLOSURE 
AGREEMENT (2007), https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/23/2001830854/-1/-
1/0/CG_4100N.PDF. 
 153. See, e.g., Long Island Fisherman Pleads Guilty to Falsifying Document and 
Lying to Federal Investigators, DEP’T OF JUST. (June 2, 2016), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/long-island-fisherman-pleads-guilty-falsifying-documents-and-lying-
federal-investigators. 
 154. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; Seafood Im-
port Monitoring Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,975, 88,987 (Dec. 9, 2016) (to be codified 
at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902, 50 C.F.R. pts. 300, 600). 
 155. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 920–21 (Ind. 1993). 
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information is also likely to be considered a protected “formula, pattern, com-
pilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,” provided it also 
meets the remaining two provisions of the UTSA’s definition.156 
Commercial maritime operations will find the barriers posed by the sec-
ond part of the UTSA harder to overcome.  The first requirement, that the in-
formation in question derive “independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its dis-
closure or use,” is relatively straightforward.157  Courts have found that this 
criterion is met as long as the information is novel, kept secret from competi-
tors, and economically valuable.158  In the case of marine operations, novel 
technologies or methods used to effectively harvest resources from the ocean 
are likely to meet the standard of deriving independent economic value from 
not being generally known.  While any techniques shared with competitors 
would not qualify as a trade secret under this definition, those techniques are 
also the information that operators are least likely to object to having observed 
by UUV. 
The more difficult question in analyzing this standard is whether the 
methods and equipment being used by commercial entities at sea constitute 
information that is readily ascertainable using “proper means.”  If they are, then 
no trade secret protection will exist.  Historically, as discussed previously,159 
information on the methods and techniques being used in remote areas of the 
ocean by private operators would not have been readily ascertainable to outside 
parties.  Deep-sea commercial operations are usually prohibitively far from 
shore, and the majority of interesting commercial methods or equipment are 
only visible beneath the surface of the ocean.  Thus, for many years information 
about commercial vessel operations was unlikely to be “readily attainable.”  
With the advent of UUVs, this information is much more easily obtained with-
out resorting to any improper methods.  However, use of UUVs to investigate 
distant commercial operations may not reach the level of “readily attainable.”  
In the majority of states, courts look to the amount of time, money, and effort 
expended to obtain the information in question to make such determination.160  
In the case of UUVs, a significant amount of time, money, and effort would 
generally be required to obtain any meaningful information about commercial 
marine operations.  This may vary based on how distant an operation is from 
shore among other things, but even in these cases the cost of obtaining and 
piloting a UUV, while relatively low compared to historical equivalents, is still 
significant.  In light of this, details about the technologies and methods being 
used by commercial marine operations likely would not be considered readily 
 
 156. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 157. See id. § 1(4)(i). 
 158. Dole, Jr., supra note 46, at 95. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 146–54. 
 160. See Dole, Jr., supra note 46, at 100. 
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attainable and thus would meet this requirement of the UTSA – for the time 
being at least. 
The last part of the trade secrets definition requires that information be 
“the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.”161  As with the previous consideration of whether marine opera-
tions information is “readily attainable,” this presents an interesting interpreta-
tional problem in areas of the ocean where operations are inherently secret due 
to their location.  Terrestrially, companies can show that they have made efforts 
to maintain secrecy by taking measures intended to limit disclosure to employ-
ees or third parties or by protecting their information via physical barriers.162  
For commercial marine ventures, similar efforts may be taken to ensure that 
information is not disclosed by employees or others.  Secrecy measures are 
particularly notorious in the fishing industry.163  However, commercial entities 
at sea do not generally take additional measures to protect outsiders from view-
ing their specialized equipment or techniques.  Given that to date there has been 
no need to take extra secrecy measures, this is not likely to be a dispositive 
factor in assessing trade secrets applicability.  Courts historically have at-
tributed less importance to this factor than to the preceding two, and efforts to 
maintain secrecy through the historically necessary channels, such as prevent-
ing disclosure by employees, may be sufficient to show reasonable efforts to 
maintain secrecy have been taken.164 
All told, technical information that commercial marine ventures use to 
their economic advantage and have some desire to keep secret is likely to be 
considered a trade secret, though the exact outcome will depend both on the 
specific state and the facts in question.  If information is protected as a trade 
secret, UUVs will be limited in collecting this information.  A UUV collecting 
any details on the methods or equipment being used by commercial operations 
that was proprietary enough to be considered a trade secret would be subject to 
a trade secrets claim for misappropriation.  Misappropriation occurs when trade 
secrets are acquired, disclosed, or used without permission.165  In the case of 
UUVs, simple observation may be enough to show that trade secrets have been 
“acquired,” subjecting UUV operators immediately to trade secret claims. 
Trade secret protection may thus represent some of the strongest protec-
tions for marine operators from UUV surveillance, though this protection is 
limited to commercial entities.  Other private law protections have boundaries 
that are far less clear and will be shaped significantly by judicial interpretation 
in the coming years. 
 
 161. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4)(ii). 
 162. See Dole, Jr., supra note 46, at 102–03. 
 163. See, e.g., Meghan Miner, Trade Secrets at Sea – How Much Information Is 
Enough?, COMPASS (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.compassscicomm.org/single-
post/2012/11/26/Trade-Secrets-At-Sea%E2%80%94How-Much-Information-Is-
Enough. 
 164. See Dole, Jr., supra note 46, at 100–03. 
 165. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2). 
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B. Underwater Privacy Under U.S. Public Law 
Protection from individual actors may be increasingly important as recre-
ational and commercial UUV use swells, but protection from government sur-
veillance is likely to be a far greater issue.  The ocean, both in U.S. territorial 
waters and on the high seas, is notorious as an “operational sanctuary” – that 
is, a place where enforcement of regulations is in many ways impossible.166  
The result of this is that many areas of today’s oceans are effectively lawless.167  
Despite the best efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard and other enforcement bodies, 
monitoring ship and commercial activity on an ocean basin scale is practically 
impossible.  Widespread safety, environmental, immigration, and fiscal viola-
tions are the norm, as are more extreme crimes like piracy, slavery, and mur-
der.168 
UUVs offer the U.S. government a chance to monitor and enforce the law 
over greater scales than ever before.  The Coast Guard and others have recog-
nized the potential importance of this development, devoting significant funds 
to research and development of UUVs.169  As plans are being laid to increase 
governmental monitoring, the question of what limits exist to this monitoring 
is a critical one.  In this Section, I examine the boundaries the U.S. Constitution 
places on governmental surveillance underwater.  First, I look at the Fourth 
Amendment background that forms the basis of limits on governmental 
searches.  I then apply this existing law to different classes of entities at sea, 
finding that in almost all cases the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
government surveillance are likely to be significantly weaker at sea than on 
land.  I argue that already eroded marine privacy protections are faced with 
potentially fatal threats as governmental UUV use expands. 
On land, Fourth Amendment law is well developed though constantly 
evolving.  At sea, however, this precedent remains, in many ways, in its in-
fancy.170  Large gaps exist in our understanding of what is and is not protected 
at sea by the Fourth Amendment primarily because until now there has been 
no need to consider them.  Cases of governmental search and seizure of com-
mercial structures at sea, for instance, have simply not occurred; to search this 
way in previous decades would have been cost-prohibitive.  The increasing 
availability of UUVs has changed this.  For the first time, broad scale govern-
mental surveillance of activities taking place in the ocean is a viable prospect 
both technologically and economically.  This is occurring at the same time that 
 
 166. See Wrathall, supra note 5, at 234. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Urbina, supra note 21. 
 169. See, e.g., SCOT T. TRIPP, RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER, U.S. COAST 
GUARD, AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES (AUVS): A LOOK AT COAST GUARD 
NEEDS TO CLOSE PERFORMANCE GAPS AND ENHANCE CURRENT MISSION 
PERFORMANCE 4 (2006), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a450814.pdf. 
 170. See Lauren Estrin, Comment, The Preservation of Privacy Interests at Sea: 
The Need for Meaningful Scope Limits on Custom Official and the Coast Guard’s 
Sweeping Authority to Search Vessels, 29 TUL. MAR. L. J. 105, 124 (2004). 
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non-drone technologies have opened the ocean to broader commercial and rec-
reational interests, leading to an explosion in the number of entities working in 
the ocean.171  We stand now at a point where rapidly increasing use is followed 
by exploding governmental monitoring with no clear understanding of what, if 
any, limitations our privacy regimes place on this governmental surveillance. 
1. Fourth Amendment Background 
Before delving specifically into what privacy rights exist for different en-
tities at sea, I turn to a basic discussion of the relevant portions of Fourth 
Amendment law.  The Fourth Amendment forms the foundation of privacy 
protections under U.S. law, applying to all territory under the jurisdiction of 
the United States.172  This includes ocean waters up to twelve miles from shore 
as well as all U.S. flagged vessels.173  Any drones operated by the government 
in these areas must comply with the Fourth Amendment, which protects the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”174 
Current Fourth Amendment case law is built on the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States, which found that a search is 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment when a person has “exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and . . . the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”175  Two elements must 
be met for a privacy right to exist under Katz – a demonstrated intent to keep 
the activities in question private and a finding that this expectation is societally 
justified.176  Both of these prongs create special problems in the case of marine 
surveillance, a world where – to date – privacy has not been a major concern 
of individuals or society. 
Katz was further extended in the Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States 
– a decision that provides additional insight into what level of surveillance by 
UUV may be allowable.177  In Kyllo, the Court addressed whether police use 
of a thermal-imaging device to scan a person’s home was constitutionally per-
missible.178  The Court found that it was not, noting that “obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that 
 
 171. See Svati Kirsten Narula, America’s Ocean-Powered Economy, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/americas-
ocean-powered-economy/284516/. 
 172. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990). 
 173. UNCLOS, supra note 104, at 400 (“Every State has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”); id. at 433. 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 175. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 176. Id. 
 177. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 178. Id. at 29. 
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could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a con-
stitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search – at least where . . . the tech-
nology in question is not in general public use.”179  In coming to this conclu-
sion, the Court emphasized the need to protect the private sanctity of the 
home.180  This recognition of more stringent privacy protections for the inti-
mate areas of the home has been a universal theme in Fourth Amendment in-
terpretation, particularly in cases where new technologies are being used.181  
Kyllo also raises the question of the constitutionality of new, sophisticated sen-
sory technology – an important consideration in the case of UUVs.  Taken to-
gether, Kyllo and Katz introduce the Fourth Amendment framework that I will 
consider in more detail as it applies to marine UUV use.  I look to specific cases 
from the marine realm as well as from terrestrial drones to understand potential 
application at sea. 
Thus, in addition to Katz’s considerations of what society is prepared to 
consider reasonable, effective analysis of maritime UUV use also needs to es-
tablish whether any areas at sea are effectively equivalent to areas of the home 
and thus subject to heightened privacy protections.  To address these factors, I 
first turn to Katz’s first prong, finding that a subjective expectation of privacy 
generally exists at sea.  I then turn to Katz’s second prong, analyzing how the 
Fourth Amendment has been interpreted at sea in the past and whether different 
types of maritime operators have a reasonable expectation of freedom from 
surveillance.  Last, I address the sensory capabilities of UUVs themselves and 
argue that the government’s use of certain types of sensing devices is unlikely 
to be constitutional.  As a result, I argue that while the existing Fourth Amend-
ment case law correctly provides only limited protection to purely commercial 
entities, it fails to provide the protections due to living spaces at sea.  In the 
face of increasing potential for infringement on seaborne living spaces by 
UUVs, it is critical that these be strengthened. 
2. A Subjective Expectation of Privacy Usually Exists at Sea 
Demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy, the first element of 
Katz, is one that normally receives little attention from courts,182 but it raises 
interesting issues underwater.  In the terrestrial context, exhibiting an expecta-
tion of privacy is often a straightforward and not particularly thought-intensive 
endeavor.  It can be as simple as closing a door behind you in a phone booth183 
 
 179. Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
512 (1961)). 
 180. Id. at 40. 
 181. Id. at 33, 35–36. 
 182. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1(c) (5th ed. 2012), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2018) (“[L]ittle 
attention has been given to the independent significance of the first factor or to precisely 
how it is to be interpreted”). 
 183. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
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or placing your belongings in a bag that is not transparent.184  Courts have 
found that as long as actions are out of the general view of the public, an ex-
pectation of privacy has been shown.185  Doors or walls are enough to create 
this expectation.186  These have some meaning because they stand apart from 
the many places that are not surrounded by doors or walls: porches, backyards, 
or public roads to name a few.  At sea this same distinction generally does not 
exist.  Nearly everything operating in the marine environment is completely 
enclosed for the simple functional reason that it would otherwise be full of 
water.  Thus, if all it takes to demonstrate an intent to keep marine activities 
private is that these activities not be visible to the general public, this factor 
would nearly always be met at sea by simple operational necessity.187  Courts 
tend to find that so long as items are not exposed in plain view this element is 
satisfied, regardless of the functional question of why they are not in plain 
view.188 
From the perspective of potential invasions of privacy by drones, how-
ever, what is inside a ship is less interesting than what is going on around it.  
While drones may have some hull-penetrative capabilities,189 the majority of 
observations by UUVs will be of the outside of marine structures.  Whether a 
subjective expectation of privacy is exhibited in these cases is much less clear.  
Maritime interests may take some precautions to protect their privacy in the 
form of radar use to observe any nearby vessels, but these measures tend to be 
haphazard and incomplete.190  It is unclear whether this is because these entities 
do not care about the privacy of their facilities or simply because they reason-
ably expect that their remote location and the opacity of seawater will prevent 
anyone from observing them.  A manifestation of a subjective expectation of 
privacy may then be extremely difficult to assess in marine environments.  This 
first factor is often conflated with the second part of Katz, and many academics 
argue that Fourth Amendment privacy rights should not turn on whether a tar-
get manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.191 
 
 184. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
 185. Lee Tien, Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precau-
tions in Fourth Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873, 874–75 (2005). 
 186. Id. at 874. 
 187. One exception here would be open-ocean aquaculture where installations are 
open to the environment. 
 188. Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveil-
lance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 753–54 (1985). 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 190. See, e.g., Hong Li et al., Security and Privacy in Localization for Underwater 
Sensor Networks, IEEE COMM. MAG., Nov. 2015, at 56, 56. 
 191. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth 
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 250 (1993). 
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3. Is an Expectation of Privacy from Surveillance by UUVs Reasona-
ble? 
The second prong of Katz is the more important consideration in estab-
lishing marine privacy rights: is there an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize on and around underwater facilities?  In the maritime 
context, there are two critical inquiries: what reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy exist at sea in general and what reasonable expectations of privacy exist 
specifically from surveillance by drones? 
Turning to the first of these, courts have found that more limited Fourth 
Amendment protections exist at sea than on land.  The majority of the cases 
arise on ships192 – areas where governmental intrusion is the norm under the 
Coast Guard’s sweeping right to board.193  Under the authorization of 14 
U.S.C. § 89, Coast Guard officers “may at any time go on board of any vessel 
subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United 
States.”194  While the resulting searches are technically limited to safety and 
document inspections, in practice the Coast Guard routinely uses these for 
much broader purposes, including searches for drugs and other contraband.195  
The constitutionality of this broad statutory grant of authority to conduct 
“boarding[s] that would be unconstitutional under any reasonableness stand-
ard”196 is the subject of robust and ongoing debate in the academic commu-
nity.197  This debate is for the most part not echoed by courts, however.  The 
Coast Guard’s sweeping right to board and search ships continues to be upheld, 
and it is widely understood that Fourth Amendment protections are conse-
quently so weak as to be meaningless in many cases at sea.198 
The entirety of Fourth Amendment law at sea stems from these direct 
Coast Guard vessel boardings.  However, UUVs are unlikely to engage in this 
type of direct search on a vessel.  Instead, UUVs are more likely to gather data 
on the outside of commercial installations or vessels, perhaps using acoustic 
and other sensors to obtain information about the inside of the vessel.  While 
the limits of Fourth Amendment protections may be relatively clear in the case 
of direct boardings on ships themselves, these limits have not yet been estab-
lished for surveillance occurring around them.  Here, I look to what, if any, 
privacy rights are likely to exist around vessels, commercial installations, and 
 
 192. See James S. Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 51, 52–54 (1977). 
 193. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2018). 
 194. Id. § 89(a). 
 195. Megan Jaye Kight, Note, Constitutional Barriers to Smooth Sailing: 14 U.S.C. 
§ 89(a) and the Fourth Amendment, 72 IND. L. J. 571, 572 (1997). 
 196. Howard S. Marks, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High 
Seas?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537, 1560 (1983). 
 197. See generally Estrin, supra note 170, Kight, supra note 195; Linda A. New-
land, Searches and Seizures at Sea: Trying to Balance Governmental Interests Against 
the Fourth Amendment, 16 TUL. MAR. L. J. 319 (1992). 
 198. See Estrin, supra note 170, at 111–12. 
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other marine entities and argue that current Fourth Amendment protections 
must be made more robust. 
a. Unmanned Commercial Structures 
I look first at the privacy rights that exist around fixed commercial struc-
tures that are characterized by the absence of people living on them.  Drilling 
rigs, undersea cables, and mining equipment are examples of uninhabited struc-
tures.  In the next Section, I will turn to structures that are mobile and occupied 
by humans under the broad umbrella of vessels. 
On land, commercial structures enjoy Fourth Amendment protections199 
but ones that are less protective than those afforded to private homes.200  Courts 
have recognized that the strength of the Fourth Amendment is greatest when 
protecting the intimate areas of people’s homes.201  In commercial areas, these 
intimate details are not found and consequently the privacy regime covering 
these areas is far weaker.202  Lesser protections are also justified for businesses 
where the general public has an invitation to enter – to not allow law enforce-
ment to enter would be unreasonable.203 
In practice, the lesser protections that commercial properties are afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment means that observation of industrial facilities is 
generally allowed so long as police officers do not enter onto premises from 
which the public is excluded.204  In cases of aerial surveillance, even surveil-
lances occurring with sophisticated and new technologies, governmental ob-
servation of industrial premises has been allowed under the Fourth Amend-
ment.205  In the landmark Dow Chemical case, the court based this conclusion 
on the understanding that “an industrial complex is more comparable to an 
open field and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in 
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near 
the area for the reach of cameras.”206  However, observations that enable law 
 
 199. See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, 
like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free 
from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.”). 
 200. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–700 (1987) (“An expectation of pri-
vacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar 
expectation in an individual’s home.”). 
 201. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, 
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying govern-
ment eyes.” (alteration in original)). 
 202. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (“The intimate 
activities associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply do not 
reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a manufacturing 
plant.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985). 
 204. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). 
 205. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 233–34. 
 206. Id. at 239. 
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enforcement to “see” inside buildings are unlikely to be constitutional even 
under the relaxed Fourth Amendment application to commercial structures.207 
This central understanding of how the Fourth Amendment applies to ter-
restrial structures provides the basis for how the Fourth Amendment is likely 
to be applied to commercial structures at sea.  As on land, commercial struc-
tures at sea are not characterized by the “intimate details” that would make 
them the subject of heightened privacy requirements and would be likened to 
an open field.  Following Dow Chemical, governmental visual observation of 
commercial facilities is likely to be upheld in the marine context just as it in 
terrestrially.208 
However, there are significant differences between the physical aspects 
of commercial facilities on land and at sea.  On land, factories and other indus-
trial structures are located on (often vast) parcels of land that are privately 
owned.  Thus, most of the relevant activities happening around these factories 
occur on private land.  In contrast, at sea there is generally no private ownership 
of the water surrounding commercial installations.209  That is not to say that no 
activity occurs in these zones – commercial structures at sea have many differ-
ent things occurring around them.  From commercial divers to ROVs to boats 
ferrying workers and cables running to shore, fixed commercial structures sit 
at the center of a complicated web of activity.  Commercial activity, which on 
land is likely to be primarily on private property, is in publicly owned and ac-
cessible waters.  In light of this, some might argue that commercial structures 
at sea should be subject to even weaker privacy protections than on land.  
Weaker privacy protections are unlikely, however, given that courts have lik-
ened the privately-owned land around industrial buildings to “open fields.”210  
Although not public property, open fields share many characteristics with pub-
lic ocean waters while having few of the heightened rights that come with pri-
vate property ownership.  The similarities between industrial facilities on land, 
located on unprotected open fields, and at sea, located in public waters, are 
strong and support a similar Fourth Amendment application.  Furthermore, 
even on land – where private and public land delineations are frequent and clear 
– courts have generally found that reasonable expectations of privacy, not own-
ership lines, are the critical factor in determining where Fourth Amendment 
protections apply.211  At first glance then, governmental visual surveillance 
around marine commercial structures likely is legal when carried out from pub-
lic waters. 
This becomes slightly more complicated in the case of non-visual surveil-
lance, particularly when technologies being used can potentially penetrate the 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. Exceptions to this may exist in areas where the seafloor is being leased.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 210. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 236. 
 211. It is important to delineate this from trespass, where property boundaries are a 
crucial delineating line, as discussed supra Section II.A.1. 
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hull to “see inside” a commercial structure.  In finding that aerial surveillance 
of industrial facilities did not constitute a search in Dow Chemical, the Court 
emphasized that “the [Environmental Protection Agency] was not employing 
some unique sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the walls of 
buildings and record conversations in Dow’s plants, offices or laboratories, but 
rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera . . . .”212  In assessing 
the constitutionality of UUV surveillance, any sensory equipment that is able 
to penetrate the superstructures of marine vessels and other equipment would 
immediately seem to be suspect under the Fourth Amendment.  This is cer-
tainly possible with current acoustic sensing technologies – sound waves prop-
agate far better underwater and can easily allow listening devices to hear con-
versations going on inside vessels.213  Acoustic or thermal imaging technolo-
gies allowing the government to see inside structures are unlikely to be a con-
stitutional method of surveillance. 
Applying limited privacy protections to industrial marine structures is 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment rationale that we see on land.  Just as 
the court in Dow Chemical recognized that industrial facilities are not imbued 
with the same intimate details that make privacy rights so important in the 
home,214 marine structures, too, are marked by an absence of intimate features.  
Indeed, there are no significant characteristics of marine industries that would 
support a divergence from this terrestrial norm for policy reasons except per-
haps the longstanding expectation that operations at sea have historically been 
free from observation due to their location.  From a policy perspective, this 
expectation of privacy has for the most part yielded societally unfortunate con-
sequences because widespread disregard of basic human rights, environmental, 
and criminal laws are the norm throughout the world’s oceans.215  If anything, 
increased observation of previously secretive marine operators may help to re-
veal the most egregious lawbreakers at sea and make law enforcement more 
feasible on an ocean-basin scale.216  In light of this, finding that marine indus-
trial structures enjoy limited privacy protections from outside visual surveil-
lance has support both from terrestrial case law as well as broader societal aims. 
b. Manned Structures and Vessels 
Vessels are distinct from commercial structures both because they are 
mobile and because they are not used purely for industrial purposes.  Vessels 
 
 212. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238. 
 213. See Chris Fox, Technologies for Ocean Acoustic Monitoring, OCEAN 
EXPLORER, https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/sound01/background/technol-
ogy/technology.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 214. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. 
 215. See Urbina, supra note 21. 
 216. In fact, efforts are currently underway to use UUVs and other technologies for 
this very purpose.  See Unmanned Systems, SECURE OUR OCEANS, http://secure-
oceans.org/categories/unmanned_systems (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
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boast human crews that not only work but also live onboard the ships.217  The 
spaces in which they live create an important distinction given that the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment are strongest in the “intimate areas of the 
home.”218  If courts were to find that these same intimate elements are present 
onboard ships, stricter Fourth Amendment protections against searches should 
apply, as many scholars have argued.219 
This distinction between the potentially intimate areas of vessels and 
commercial structures at sea is unimportant except in cases where UUVs are 
able to obtain information about the inside of a vessel.  When observation is 
merely external, no personal details are likely to be obtained and vessels are 
not significantly distinct from commercial structures.  Like commercial struc-
tures, external visual observation of vessels is probably not a Fourth Amend-
ment violation so long as it takes place from public waters.220  However, where 
UUVs use hull-penetrative technologies, the constitutionality of observation 
will turn on the distinction between the intimate living spaces and public spaces 
on vessels, as well as the type of sensors the UUV itself is using. 
Turning to the first of these, courts do draw a distinction between the liv-
ing quarters and public spaces of a vessel in cases assessing searches incident 
to the Coast Guard’s right to board.221  Recognizing that crew living spaces 
have many of the intimate details characteristic of the home, courts have noted 
that crewmembers retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in their own quar-
ters whether they are shared with others or not.222  How strong this expectation 
of privacy is depends on the nature and use of the vessel, with courts more 
prepared to recognize privacy rights the longer the vessel is at sea under the 
rationale that ships away from shore for months at a time are truly the homes 
of their crewmembers.223 
However, this distinction in practice is a weak one.  While courts give 
some theoretical credit to the idea that living quarters should be free from gov-
ernmental searches absent a warrant, in practice, courts have upheld them 
whenever searches are carried out in these areas.224  These searches are gener-
ally justified under the Coast Guard’s statutory authority to conduct adminis-
trative safety and document searches, with courts noting that so long as docu-
ments or safety equipment are stored in private living areas, the Coast Guard 
has a right to access those areas as part of their statutory mandate.225  This 
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judicial conclusion overlooks the reality that any properly equipped vessel is 
required to have safety equipment in crew living quarters, such as fire extin-
guishers and personal flotation devices.226  In light of this, the Coast Guard has 
effectively unlimited authority to search any area of a ship, regardless of what 
“intimate details” of crewmember lives may be present.  Academic commen-
tators have long lamented the sweeping authority courts have granted to the 
Coast Guard pursuant to this statutory right, with many arguing that the current 
standards result in routine Fourth Amendment violations.227  As potential for 
surveillance at sea increases dramatically, it is critical to solidify and strengthen 
the distinction between living spaces and public spaces at sea. 
This is even more pressing given that rationalizing limited Fourth 
Amendment protections on the basis of maritime safety is a tenuous argument 
at best in the case of UUVs.  While the Coast Guard boards vessels specifically 
to check that safety equipment on board complies with statutory requirements, 
any proposed safety rationale for observation of a vessel by UUV is much less 
concrete.  In searching vessels to understand their compliance with safety reg-
ulations, the Coast Guard focuses on determining whether vessels have the ap-
propriate life safety equipment, including fire extinguishing systems, life rafts, 
personal flotation devices, navigational lights, and distress communication 
methods.228  Additionally, Coast Guard searches seek to assess whether vessels 
are legally documented and comply with appropriate customs and immigration 
protocols.229  Even highly sophisticated UUVs with hull-penetrating sensing 
devices would be unable to obtain any meaningful information about the ves-
sel’s documentation or how many fire extinguishers are located in the ship’s 
engine room.  Attempting to apply the same safety rationale to justify govern-
mental UUV observation of vessels is thus unlikely to be successful.  This is 
not to say that UUVs have no function in assessing a vessel’s compliance with 
safety regulations more generally: important information about what ships are 
discharging and whether they are violating environmental pollution laws may 
ultimately be one of the most useful potentials of UUVs.  However, discharge 
information is not generally included in the scope of the Coast Guard’s board-
ing authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).230   Regardless, this type of information 
would be gathered by UUVs about the outside of vessels and would certainly 
not be sufficient to justify the observation of intimate details about the persons 
onboard them with thermal or acoustic technologies.  Thus, UUV observation 
should not be protected under the same rationale that has led to the unfortunate 
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erosion of Fourth Amendment rights onboard ships to date.  Living spaces must 
be free from intrusive surveillance by UUVs. 
Beyond the constitutional limits that should be placed on observation of 
living spaces by UUV, additional limits may exist for general UUV surveil-
lance due to its status as a new technology.  Using newly developed and so-
phisticated technologies that are not widely available to the general public has 
been understood by courts to create potential Fourth Amendment violations, as 
society may not yet be prepared to recognize that observation by these devices 
is reasonable.231  UUVs themselves are new technologies, as are many of the 
sensory devices that they carry.  I look to the potential Fourth Amendment 
limits placed on surveillance by each of these in turn. 
First, while UUVs themselves are becoming increasingly common in the 
ocean, it is unlikely that they are common enough that commercial and other 
marine interests should expect observation by them.  UUVs have been used for 
decades, but to date their use has been limited both in function and in scale.  
ROVs, by definition, can only be used in the area immediately around com-
mercial installations or vessels, connected to these vessels as they are with a 
tether.  Facilities operating on their own far from any other structures would 
historically have no reason to expect any type of UUV to be near them, let 
alone observing them.  This is likely to support a judicial finding that an ex-
pectation of privacy from observation by UUV is reasonable.  How long this 
remains reasonable will depend on how rapidly UUV use and surveillance pro-
liferate. 
The visual capabilities of UUVs are unlikely on their own to pose any 
additional Fourth Amendment issues.  Advanced visual technologies that allow 
police officers to see into homes are restricted under the Fourth Amendment.232  
However, the same magnification technologies used to observe industrial com-
plexes have been allowed under current Fourth Amendment case law.233  As 
such, visual observation by UUV may be restricted so long as UUV use re-
mains new and unexpected but is unlikely to pose any additional issues beyond 
this. 
Other forms of UUV surveillance, however, are more constitutionally am-
biguous.  With visual observation inherently limited in its utility by low visi-
bility in much of the oceans, other methods of surveillance, such as chemical, 
thermal, and acoustic imaging, will be more prevalent.  These sensing capaci-
ties dramatically expand the capabilities of UUVs, potentially allowing them 
to “see” inside vessels.  Constitutionally this raises additional concerns.  In the 
case of technologies that are able to penetrate buildings, courts have raised 
concerns when these technologies are able to ascertain intimate details of the 
home.234 
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Chemical sensing capabilities open the possibility for government entities 
to “see” what is occurring inside vessels.  Chemical water content and acoustic 
and pressure sensing devices may be able to gain a far broader picture of un-
derwater activity than just visual sensing.  Because of this, these devices are 
likely to become important tools for government monitoring of underwater be-
havior.  Particularly in relation to environmental regulations, which often pro-
hibit chemical releases, devices that are able to ascertain whether any chemi-
cals are being emitted into the water may be crucial in discovering and litigat-
ing environmental non-compliance.  In the terrestrial context, police use sev-
eral techniques that sense the chemical content of air outside homes or cars to 
detect drugs inside with varied constitutional results.  The Court has found that 
police use of dogs to smell around cars – a common investigative technique 
– is constitutional235 while bringing a dog onto the front porch of a home to 
sniff for drugs is unconstitutional.236  In finding that bringing a dog onto a 
porch to conduct a search was unconstitutional, the majority’s decision hinged 
on their finding that the front porch was part of the home and thus police entry 
to conduct a search without permission constituted a search for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.237   
Courts, however, are likely to treat vessels more like cars than homes.  
UUVs conducting surveillance from outside a vessel will not be on the equiv-
alent of a front porch.  Instead, they will be conducting their surveillance from 
public waters, just as drug dogs investigating cars are searching in public areas.  
While courts do sometimes recognize that vessels have home-like living spaces 
inside of them, at present, courts do not extend this umbrella of protection to 
the other parts of the vessel.238  UUV sensing technologies that can ascertain 
the chemical content of water around the ship to understand what is going on 
inside of it would thus likely be analogized to trained dogs sniffing around the 
exterior of a car.  Assuming that no other interference with the vessel happens 
during this surveillance, courts are likely to find that, just like with cars, exter-
nal surveillance from public vantage points is constitutional. 
Treating vessels like cars is problematic – however neat the analogy.  Cur-
rent judicial interpretation already allows for arguably unconstitutional 
searches of crewmembers’ private living quarters, and allowing UUV surveil-
lance of the outside of vessels will further infringe the crewmembers’ rights.  
Current maritime Fourth Amendment precedent makes a distinction between 
the intimate living spaces of vessels and the public spaces, but that distinction 
should not be applied to permit widespread UUV surveillance.  Although the 
Coast Guard has statutory authority to board vessels to conduct safety and doc-
ument searches, no such rationale exists for hull-penetrative UUV technology.  
Furthermore, while the motor vehicle exception allows Fourth Amendment 
searches of Recreational Vehicles (“RV”s), which have a similar combination 
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of living spaces as ships, the primary rationale behind this exception is to pre-
vent these mobile vehicles from getting away from law enforcement.239  This 
argument is less relevant for the Coast Guard, as there is always a right to stop 
and board vessels under their statutory authority.240  In the absence of a safety 
or exigency rationale, searching inside of enclosed private property absent a 
warrant should be constitutionally barred under the Fourth Amendment.  This 
is even more critical given that vessels are the homes of the crewmembers 
onboard them.  It does not matter that some areas of the vessel are used for less 
intimate purposes, like propulsion.  The areas of the home most likely to yield 
illegal marijuana growing, for instance greenhouses and basements, are simi-
larly not associated with particularly intimate details.  Nonetheless, these 
spaces are included under the broad protection afforded to the home as a whole.  
Courts do not attempt to ascertain which areas of the home are the most inti-
mate areas, instead the act of living in a space renders the whole space the 
subject of heightened privacy protections.  This same rationale should apply to 
vessels.  While crewmembers may sleep in certain areas of a vessel, this does 
not mean that the intimate details of their lives are not found throughout the 
ship.  Intimate activities are just as likely to happen (and are perhaps more 
likely) to happen outside of the bunks.  Just as entire homes are protected under 
the Fourth Amendment, so too should entire ships.  That any governmental 
rationale for hull-penetrative surveillance is weak at best simply enforces this 
point. 
c. Over People 
The last category of major interest in the maritime realm where privacy 
rights may come into play are the interests of people themselves.  This may 
seem to be a relatively insignificant class given the dearth of humans in most 
areas of the ocean, however, recent drone developments targeted towards di-
vers make this an important consideration.  The iBubble, for instance, is a pro-
totype drone designed specifically to operate with divers, tracking and filming 
their movements.241  While the iBubble’s designers describe it as designed to 
provide divers with films of themselves diving for their own use and entertain-
ment,242 the potential privacy questions that surround the iBubble and similar 
devices are significant.  While systemized governmental monitoring of diving 
may be far in the future, monitoring of areas where diving is popular and the 
local environment has been degraded by human interference could be achieved 
easily by sending a UUV to continuously monitor the activities of divers.  In 
these cases, Fourth Amendment issues may arise if divers held a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from government surveillance. 
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 242. Id. 
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People are frequently subject to government surveillance in public spaces 
on land.  The government is allowed to conduct terrestrial surveillance to the 
extent that it does not interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy.243  
Similarly, private parties can sometimes surveille each other: courts have gen-
erally found that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in public spaces 
where other people can see you.244  However, the extent to which our lives may 
be tracked by modern technology is controversial.  The public generally finds 
aerial drones that track a specific person’s movements more invasive than se-
curity cameras or other passive surveillance devices the same way it finds any 
surveillance of one person in public spaces that continues for an extended pe-
riod of time more invasive than other forms of surveillance.245  Nevertheless, 
courts still use the baseline standard of reasonable expectation of privacy when 
evaluating the privacy issues these devices raise.246 
It is unclear whether diver-tracking drones would be considered a privacy 
invasion under the definition of a reasonable expectation of privacy that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.247  Given the newness of underwater 
drone technology,248 it may be that diver-tracking drones are not devices whose 
use society is currently prepared to recognize as reasonable.  However, as these 
UUVs become more commonly used by divers or the government in popular 
dive sites, the expectation of underwater privacy might stop being reasonable.  
Just as in public spaces on land, divers generally dive in areas where many 
others can see them – and this is a reality that undermines their expectation of 
privacy. 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment may protect surveillance from govern-
ment UUVs for a time while these technologies remain new, however, in the 
long run it is unlikely that the Fourth Amendment will protect divers from gov-
ernment surveillance.  It is also important to look at the policy aims of the 
Fourth Amendment in determining whether this result is correct.  Understand-
ing what society recognizes as reasonable should require an analysis of “the 
customs and values of the past and present.”249  In this context, allowing gov-
ernment drones to observe various entities at sea would be inconsistent with 
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the ideals of a free and open society in that it would require unreasonable bur-
dens on any who wished to maintain their privacy.250 
There are strong policy arguments for encouraging a more robust privacy 
regime at sea than may currently exist under the Fourth Amendment.  While 
some inherent privacy protections are built into land-based structures simply 
through the existence of private property boundaries, no such limits exist at 
sea.  Thus, while terrestrial buildings are shielded from intrusion and observa-
tion by the government (or competing commercial interests) due to the simple 
fact that they are surrounded by private property, installations at sea enjoy none 
of the same privacy buffer.251 
Despite the policy considerations that argue for privacy protections at sea 
comparable to those on land, at present neither public nor private law provides 
them.  Scholars have argued for more Fourth Amendment protections for mar-
itime operations.252  These calls to date seem to have fallen on deaf ears.  As 
UUV use increases, however, privacy concerns likely will draw more public 
and legal attention.  Perhaps this attention will allow for a thorough reconsid-
eration of how the Fourth Amendment continues to be misapplied at sea. 
III. PRIVACY UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 
I now turn to privacy rights under international law.  U.S. jurisdiction 
extends out twelve nautical miles from the coastline, with the area beyond this 
subject to UNCLOS.253  However, vessels flagged in the United States are al-
ways subject to U.S. jurisdiction and law, regardless of their location in the 
world.254  Similarly, all vessels operating in international waters are subject to 
the laws of their flag state,255 while commercial structures are subject to the 
laws of the nation they have obtained seafloor leases from.256  Thus, privacy 
issues on the high seas will for the most part be dealt with under the national 
law applicable to the vessel in question.  However, there are some cases where 
understanding the international legal regime governing privacy and UUV op-
eration may be important in delineating privacy rights more broadly.  I explore 
these here. 
The main difference in privacy protections in international waters is in 
the realm of public law.  For private law concerns, issues of trespass are likely 
to be resolved under the umbrella of national law.  Public privacy protections 
on the high seas, however, are not governed by the Fourth Amendment, and its 
 
 250. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974). 
 251. See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
 252. See, e.g., Cullum, supra note 219, at 388; Newland, supra note 197, at 346–
47. 
 253. UNCLOS, supra note 104, at 400. 
 254. Robert D. Peltz & Lawrence W. Kaye, The Long Reach of U.S. Law over 
Crimes Occurring on the High Seas, 20 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 199, 215 (2008). 
 255. UNCLOS, supra note 104, at 434. 
 256. See id. at 400. 
42
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/6
2019] SECRETS OF THE DEEP 89 
equivalent does not exist on an international level.  The main privacy protec-
tions under international law instead will stem from private property rights as 
well as any restrictions on UUV operation that may exist under UNCLOS. 
Determining private property rights at sea is difficult under UNCLOS.257  
Ownership of submerged land resources remains one of the more contentious 
elements of this already contentious treaty.258  However, just as within territo-
rial waters, commercial entities operating both on the high seas and within Ex-
clusive Economic Zones (“EEZ”s) are regularly granted leases to exploit natu-
ral resources on the sea floor.259  International leases are functionally very sim-
ilar to U.S. leases and those granted within the U.S. EEZ are of course identical 
to leases in U.S. territorial waters.  Thus, both national and international sea-
floor leases create the same private property rights. 
Like U.S. national law, UNCLOS recognizes a right for law enforcement 
of any country to board any vessel operating in international waters but only in 
specific circumstances.260  This right is significantly more limited under 
UNCLOS than the Coast Guard’s broadly interpreted right under U.S. law.261  
Specifically, UNCLOS gives naval vessels a right to board ships when the navy 
suspects a vessel under their jurisdiction has committed a crime defined under 
that state’s laws.262  Piracy, transportation of slaves, and other limited crimes 
are subject to universal jurisdiction.263  Aside from this right to board, vessels 
operating lawfully on the high seas are understood to have the freedom of nav-
igation and are generally allowed to operate freely.264 
UNCLOS’ guarantee of the freedom of navigation does not explicitly pre-
serve the right to be free of unreasonable searches for a ship.265  The lack of an 
explicit prohibition on searches, coupled with a long and storied history of sub-
marine surveillance in the oceans, likely means that UUV observation will gen-
erally be allowed under UNCLOS so long as it does not interfere with the pro-
tected freedom of navigation.  UNCLOS’ guarantee of freedom of navigation 
is subject to specific regulations of the flag state of any UUV carrying out ob-
servations, however, with which vessels must comply.266 
I now turn briefly to examine what limits the UNCLOS places on how 
drones operate and whether these operations may infringe on privacy rights.  
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UNCLOS provides a framework that governs the operation of vessels in the 
territorial seas and EEZs of other nations.  While UNCLOS has no provisions 
that specifically cover privacy rights at sea, there are several considerations 
that may limit the operation of drones in ways that would infringe on privacy 
rights. 
Generally speaking, the critical determination in assessing drone opera-
tion under UNCLOS will be whether drones are considered vessels.  This ques-
tion has been the subject of considerable debate by scholars who have reached 
no certain conclusion.267  Functionally, however, there are few other places 
where UUVs are likely to fit into the international legal regime.  While it may 
be uncertain whether free-swimming drones would be considered vessels, they 
are even less likely to fall into the categories of “platforms or other man-made 
structures,” “aircraft,” or “submarine cables or pipelines,” which constitute the 
other major classes UNCLOS describes.268  Functionally, then, if drones are 
not considered vessels, they would likely fall into a legal no man’s land under 
the UNCLOS.  This would effectively exempt them from most substantive 
UNCLOS provisions, such as the Article 210 prohibitions on dumping that 
prohibit “any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, air-
craft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”269  Assuming that this 
result is likely to be disfavored by the international community, drones are 
probably considered vessels under UNCLOS – at least until UNCLOS issues 
further guidance. 
If UUVs are considered vessels, then their operation under UNCLOS is 
allowed globally, subject to the same freedoms and restrictions as any other 
ship.  On the high seas, states and their vessels have the freedom of navigation 
to the extent that such navigation does not interfere with the rights of other 
states.270  The freedom of navigation is not explicitly defined beyond “the right 
to sail ships,”271 but this freedom has been understood broadly to protect the 
normal operation of vessels.  Given that the majority of vessels today are 
equipped with similar sensory equipment to the average UUV, it is likely that 
UUV operation would generally be allowed on the high seas under this freedom 
of navigation when carrying out ordinary information gathering.  If the drones 
being operated are conducting scientific research, their operation is also pro-
tected under the freedom of marine scientific research codified in Article 
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143.272  Additional freedoms and restrictions, such as the requirement that the 
high seas be used only for peaceful purposes, may impact drone operation gen-
erally but are unlikely to have considerable impact from a privacy perspec-
tive.273 
Within the EEZs of other countries, UUVs operate with the same freedom 
of navigation found on the high seas and are limited only by coastal state juris-
diction over the resources in this zone.274  This resource-based jurisdiction may 
impact how drones can be used in these areas.  Specifically, Article 56 provides 
sovereign rights for the coastal state over “exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources” within a 200-mile limit.275  Commercial 
drone operation may be limited within the EEZ to the extent that it infringes 
on this coastal state right to resource exploitation. 
Drone operation within the territorial sea itself may be allowed (if UUVs 
are considered ships) under the right to innocent passage.276  This is a restricted 
right, however, and likely places significant limits on what drones are permit-
ted to do within a twelve-mile territorial limit.  Innocent passage is limited to 
navigation for the purpose of traversing the territorial sea or proceeding to a 
port.277  Furthermore, ships that engage in “collecting information to the prej-
udice of the defense or security of the coastal State,” “research or survey activ-
ities,” or “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage” are specif-
ically excluded from this right of innocent passage.278  Thus, drones operating 
in any information gathering capacity are unlikely to be allowed in the territo-
rial sea of other nations while engaging in these activities.  They may be al-
lowed to pass through territorial waters if the sensors are turned off under the 
right to innocent passage, however, this passage is also limited by the require-
ment that they operate on the surface if they are underwater vehicles.279 
It is important to note that even if drones are not within the twelve-mile 
territorial sea of another state, they may still be subject to the jurisdiction and 
national laws of that state if they are found to be “in touch with the shore.”280  
Under this jurisdictional exception, “a state may exercise authority to prevent 
violation or evasion of its revenue, customs, immigration, or sanitary laws . . . 
by ships hovering off the territorial limit, or in touch with the shore.”281  His-
torically, these were thought to be the most important laws likely to be broken 
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at sea.282  In its current state, this exception is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on UUVs carrying out surveillance activities unless surveillance is re-
lated to customs or immigration violations.  As privacy becomes a bigger issue, 
it may be interesting to see whether these categories expand at all to allow 
states the jurisdiction to enforce against privacy invasions in territorial waters. 
The international regime will be secondary to individual national ones 
when assessing privacy protections against UUV surveillance at sea.  Under 
UNCLOS, drones are likely to be considered vessels and given the same free-
dom of navigation as other vessels.  UNCLOS further has less restrictive pro-
visions governing both private property ownership and government surveil-
lance than those in U.S. law.  As such, UNCLOS is unlikely to be a major factor 
in establishing and enforcing maritime property and privacy regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
The explosion in UUV use for observation leads to serious questions 
about what privacy protections exist underwater.  From private property rights 
to Fourth Amendment constitutionality, the bounds of legal rights underwater 
remain in many ways untested.  UUVs are likely to bring new issues to light, 
illuminating a privacy regime underwater that remains fundamentally weak.  
Private property rights are inherently limited by the public nature of ocean wa-
ters, while Fourth Amendment protections have been eroded to the point of 
uselessness in many marine contexts.  Entities operating in today’s oceans 
should be aware of the threat to their privacy interests.  In the best-case sce-
nario, UUV use and surveillance can serve as a catalyst for more robust mari-
time privacy protections.  Courts should recognize that vessels are living spaces 
and extend the Fourth Amendment’s umbrella protections covering the sanctity 
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